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Analysis of Lib.-'-r I'^ticn
A Introductory.
I The problem (p.l).
We aira to formulate A. Ritschl’s criterion of religious
truth, on the basis of original investigation, as compared
with the work of other critics.
II The presuppositions of the investigation (p.l).
a A knowledge of Ritschl's theology, and e^f
b Philosophy.
Ill The sources (pp.l, 2).
a P.itschl's own writings (p.l).
b The German criticisms on Ritsciil made since his death
(p-2).
1 Ron-German criticisms are excluded, for
o( Some limitation is necessary.
(3 Ri tschliani sm is peculiarly German.
2 Reo-Ri tschlianism is excluded.
•3 Polemic during Ritschl's life-time is excluded as
too partisan.
c Material from other sources as illustrative or parallel
(p.2)
.
B Formulation and criticism of Ritschl’s criterion of truth
(pp.3 - 1S3).
I Experience
-^s being or containing a criterion of truth,
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a Ritschl's criticism of the traditional Account of
religious experience (pp.4 - 15).
1 The subjective aspect of experience (pp. 4-7).
0( The experience of repentance as traditionally
held, is not valid, because it emphasizes the
individual as against the Community (pp. 4-6).
(3 The conversion of individuals is no authoritative
criterion of the validity of their experiences
( P • ) •
y
Religious experience cannot be viewed as merely
individualistic (p.6).
2 The personal relations between the individual soul
and 3od (or Christ) (pp. 7 - 12).
o( ’"itschl rejects love to Cod as the true meaning of
faith, because it is characteristically Catholic,
and subjective (pp. 8 - 10).
^
The doctrine of the testimonium spi ri tus sane ti has
no validity, unless interpreted as activity of the
Community-consciousness (pp.lO - 12).
y The uni Q my s ti ca is not valid, because it is non-
social, and metaphysically and ethically absurd
( pp . 12 - 15 )
.
b Ritschl's own tneory of religious experience (pp.l5 -20)
1 The subjective aspect of experience (pp. 15 - 16).
CK The activity of the subject is an aspect of all
valid experience (p. 15).
Q Imunediacy in experience is a test of religious
truth (pp. 15, 16 )
.
2 The personal relations between the individual soul
and God (or Cnrist) (pp. 16 - 20).
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Ill
(X ‘-S mediated : -
i Through t-he accurate tradition of historical
facta concerning the revelation in Christ
(pp.16, 17).
ii Through mastery of the World {pp.l7, 18).
iii Through the Community (p. 18).
^
As immediate;-
In some sense, a personal experience, in-
dependent of ever 3^thing external hut God,
is the ultimate norm (pp.l8 - 20).
II Historic ns being or containing a criterion of religious
truth { pp . 20 - 49 )
.
a Orientation (pp.20 - 22).
1 History is essential to Christianity, for
0< Chri stian i ty has historical founder (pp.20, 21).
(i Its doctrine is historical tradition (p.21).
2 The problems arising from the relation of Christ-
ianity to history are not living issues for Ritschl
(pp.21, 22).
b Revelation as being or containing a criterion of truth
(pp.22 - 80).
1 Definition (pp.22, 23).
o( In the universal sense, it is whatever any re-
ligious Community believes (p.22).
(3 In the Christian sense, it is the content of the
self-consciousness of Jesus, and is final truth
(pp.22, 23).
2 Its place in the Christian religion (pp.23).
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0( It ii3 the jjupreme cii-id sole criterion of religious
tru th ( p . 23 ) .
6 It is a perfect criterion (pp. 23, 24).
\j It is (except in Jesus) unconditionally superior
to conscience (pp. 24, 25).
(5 As related to reason, it is
i !Tot wholly subject to reason — revelatio
supra ra ti onen (pp. 25, 26), and yet
ii Rationalised in theology -- sine ra t i on e
niliil intell igimus ( pp . 26 ) .
3 Individuals come into touch with the revelation
0( Through the Community (p. 27) and
(3 The Scriptures, (pp.27 - 29) which
i Require no theory of insp>ira tion, (pp. 27,
28) but
ii Are authoritative, (pp. 28, 29) as
ft Containing the essential truth, and yet
Are not infallible,
j Through Christ (pp. 29, 50).
i The content of the revelation in Christ
( p . 29 )
.
ii Its authority (p. 30).
c Christ as criterion of truth (pp. 30 - 38).
1 He is criterion because He was the sinless founder
of Christianity (pp. 50 - 32).
2 But there are many details in the tradition about
Christ that are not essential to tiie normative
Christ (pp. 32, 33).
3 The religious and ethical interpretation of Christ
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o(As royal Prophet Ke is
i rdvine, and ultimate revelation of God
{pp. 34 - 36).
ii Now living in er.altation as the object of our
faith in the Christian Community (pp.36, 37).
iii His preexistence rrrj.st be affirmed as a
mystery (later view) (pp. 37, 38).
fS As royal Priest, His inner life was in unique
relation to God (pp. 38).
d The Community as being or containing a criterion of
truth (pp. 38 - 49).
1 The ideal tendency of the Community, not the
empirical Church, is normative (pp. 39, 40).
2 The Community is a social organism, and is viewed
(X As a unity (pp. 40, 41).
i Sometimes realistically,
ii Sometimes nominalisticallyi^, and
P
Sometimes as implicated in the Kingdom of Sin
( P- 41).
3 The Relations among the terms Community, Church and
Kingdom of God (pp. 41 - 49).
oc The one criterion of membership in the Community
is the recognition of Christ (pp. 41, ^^2).
P
The Kingdom may be viewed as
i An act of d.ivine causality (dogmatic)
(pp. 42, 43), or as
ii A.n ethical act of man (p. 43).
y The presence of V/ord and Sacraments in the CoramxUnity'
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life constitutes the Church, (pp. 43 - 48)
which in some sense
i Reveals divine causality (dogmatic, p. 44)
and yet
ii Is marked by the visible human activity of
prayer (ethical, pp, 44, 45) and
iii Is organized in legal forms, which, for P.itschi’s
earlier thought, have only a teleological
value; later he came to value these forms
much more highly (pp. 45 - 48).
^ The Kingdom of God and the Church are related,
but not identical (pp. 48, 49).
Ill Metaphysics as being or containing a criterion of truth
( pp . 49 - 69 )
.
a Ritschl defines Metaphysics
1 As the in'v estiga tion of the common elements in all
being, (pp. 50, 51).
2 Every other definition reduces to this one (pp. 51, 52).
b He views ontology (pp. 52 - 57)
1 As theory of knowledge (p. 52) and
2 As proving that only the phenomena are real
(pp. 53, 54) and
3 As necessary to theology (pp. 54 - 56). Further
4 He applies his positivistic ontology to psychology
( pp. 56 - 57 ) .
c Cosmology (pp. 57 - 59),
1 Has no inner relation to theology (pp. 57, 58).
t
i
O Ritschl defines the conce{)t ’Yorld unclearly (p. 58).
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3 The God of cosraology has c,o relation to the
Christian God (pp. 58, 59).
d The Christian ’9'orld-view (pp. 59 - 69).
1 Looks on God as
o< I,ove (as revealed in Christ, pp . GO, 61), and so as
(5 Per sona li ty ( pp. 61, 68) and
'^'ill (p. 62) and
6 Knowledge (pp. 62, 63) and
6 Creator of the Vi^orld (pp. 63 - 65).
This fact is viev/ed
i Sometimes from a deistic point of view and
ii Sometimes fromi the point of viev; of the
divine immanence.
2 Looks on the \7orld as sometning to be overcome,
and yet as an essential factor in religion
( pp. 65 - 67 )
.
3 Man's sense of spiritual dignity (pp. 67 - 69).
He is an independent unity over against the
whole Y/orld, and
(3 He overcomes the World.
IV Logic (pp. 69 - 90).
a Ritschl’s thinking presupposes
1 Formal correctness (pp. 69, 70) and
2 Sympathetic attitude (p. 70).
d The tvtfo types of knowledge, scientific and religious,
are
1 Distinguished from each other with respect to
The logical conditions of knowledge (pp. 70, 71),
13 The etliical conditions of knowledge (pp. 71 - 73),
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The ps 3'c}iulct^ic-?l condi t i ons of knov'ledge
(pp. 73 - 75),
^
The object of knowledge (pp. 7b - 77).
2
Theology, as partaking of the nature of each kind
of knowing (pp. 77 - 81).
c
It }ia& eleiTients in comrrion with other sciences
(pp. 78, 79), but
e> Has a special subject-matter (pp. 79, 80), and
^
Is in some senses not scientific (pp. 80, 81).
'’alue- judging (pp. 81 - 90).
1 Criteria of value are
o(. Practical results (pp. 82, 83) and
^Ethical significance (pp. 83, 84).
2 The subject of value- judging is
Sometimes the individual (p. 8b) and
(3 Sometimes the individual as member of the Community
( pp . 8b, 86 )
.
3 The kinds of va lue- j udgi ng, - accom.pany ing and
independent (pp. 86 - 88).
4 The relations of the tv/o elements in value- j udging,
willing and feeling (pp. 88 - 90).
V Conclusions (pp. 91 - 107).
a Three fundamental criteria :-
1 The ideal tendency of the faitli of the Community in
tlie God revealed in Christ (pp. 91 - 97);
2 The ethically active nature of man (pp. 97 - 99); and
3 The "given" in experience, whether in phenomena or
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b The reHation of these criteria to eacn other; their
essential distinctions shown by quotations from Ritschl
himself (pp. 101 - ]03).
c The reasons for the contradiction in Itis empiricism
(pp. 104 - 106).
1 This empiricism wns at once his strength and
2 His weakness; for through it he
0( misunderstood Kant and Lotze (p. 104),
f3 Overlooked the unity of self-consciousness (p. 104)
\j Attributed real unity to the Community (pp. 104,
105)
,
Accepted a partially deistic view of God (pp. 105,
106)
,
6 Limited the evangelical and missionary character
of Christianity (pp. 106).
d The empiricism may be corrected by reference to
Professor Bowne’s Personalism (pp. 106, 107).
Examination of German criticisms of Ritsclil in their relation
to the present results (pp. 108 - 123).
I The criticisms agree (p. 109) only in mentioning
a Ritschl *3 obscure style,
b The savage character of the polemic waged,
c The absence of a P.itsclilian "Scliool'*.
II We discuss criticismis made by the following writers:
a 0. Pfleiderer (pp. 109 - 111),
b W. Herrmann (p. 111),
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Xa 0. Hitsc:,.! (pp. IJ'’. 11.'^)-










R. Wegener (pp. 315, IIG).
G. Scke (pp. ]1G, 117).
A. Harnack (pp. 117, 118).
J. Wendland (pp. 118, 119).
E. Vi seller (p. 119).
D. Katten’ousch (pp. 119, IJIO).
E. vor, Kugelgen (pp. 120).
A. Kostei' (pp. 120, 121).
C. Stfinge (pp. 121, 122).
C. Eabricius (p. 123).
Bibliography (pp. 124 - 130).
A RitBchi’s own writings (p. 124).
B German discussions of Ritschl and his system (pp. 124 - 127).
C Some discussions of Ri tschliani sm in other languages (p. 127).
I) Works valuable for orientation concerning the pnilosophical
and theological background of p.i tschliani sm (pp. 127 - 129).
E Magazines and works of reference (p. 130).
IU»




It is the aim of the present investigation to state and
evaluate independently the criterion of truth expressed and
implied in the theological writings of Albrecht Ritschl, and
to compare the result with the most significant German criti-
cisms of that thinker.
II The Presuppositions of the Investigation.
Because of the specific aim of our study, we shall pre-
suppose -
a a knowledge of Ritschl* s theological system, as a
whole and in its structure. Our interest is only in such
aspects of the system as are normative. We presuppose fur-
ther -
b some general knowledge of philosophy, in particular,
of logic and theory of knowledge.
III The Sources.
The sources which we shall use are -
a Ritschl* s own writings, in so far as they contain con-
structive material and not mere historical research. In
our original investigation we shall confine ourselves to this
source, except that we shall use "Die Entwicklung in Albrecht
Ritschl* B Theologie von 1874 bis 1889," by C. Pabricius
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2(Tubingen, 1909), as source for the differences in the editions
of Ritschl’s chief works, and that we shall occasionally cite
Ritschl’s letters and other data from ” Albrecht Ritschls Leben”
(2 Bd., Freiburg 1892 and 1896). In all cases we use our own
English translation from the German.
b The German criticisms on Ritschl.
1 Y/e exclude criticisms made by non-German writers because-
cx some limitation of the field is necessary, if any
fruitful result is to be attained.
0 Ritschl’s system, furthermore, is so peculiarly a
growth on German soil, out of German history (see Wendland 25-32),
that it is natural to treat it exclusively from the German point
of view.
2 The later developments of Ri tschlianism, in the so-called
”Keo-ni tschlians, *' we leave out of account, except in so far as
their writings contain a specific criticism of some phase of
Ritschl' s own system that is related to our problem.
3 Because the great majority of the criticisms made dur-
ing Ritschl' s life-time lack the perspective of his completed
writings and are, on the whole, too heated, partisan and ephem-
eral to be of permanent value, we leave them out of account;
with two exceptions. We shall note, so far as our subject re-
quires it, the criticisms to which Ritschl himself replied; and
also such contemporary criticisms as were published in new edi-
tions after Ritschl' s death,
c We shall further make occasional use of illustrative
and parallel material from the fields of philosophy and theology







•. t ^ . s. . ..-. f
'Jr^ •»*»•*
,.
. i.is ft*Zit085jH *i<i
.'tilve.-W










-It ** T .a€or t.-.i-fu*.
»-:<iJ«»«t $





: 4119^ .r C? Iji'tUlBQ <1 *Z JaaJ ^
<5'i .wtr'^
.. . wm *4




» 1*1 *• S' "i 't 3v4
ii,-t.*.i.’ aniU*!*!^ ij«I3
.„
,. ( -Tifo it Wr.:”-:











3B Formulation and Criticism of Ritschl’s
Criterion of Truth.
I Experience, as being or containing a Criterion of Truth, with
critical Analysis of Ritschl's views.
We have pointed out that we presuppose a knowledge of
Ritschl’s theology; if it had been our aim to give a systematic
account of the structure of the system, that structure would
have dictated the disposition of material in our investigation.
But, since we are approaching Ritschl from a definite and limited
point of view, precisely this point of view must determine, in
large part, our method of treatment.
What, then, is Ritschl's criterion of truth? Since the days
of Kant, at least, anyone who asks this question, or any other
question relating to logic or to philosophy in the widest sense,
must seek his answer, first in the data of experience; in the
experienced facts. The obvious starting-point is thus furnished.
And after answering this question, after having canvassed the
field of immediate experience, we find another large group of
data, which cannot strictly be described as experience in the
narrow sense, surely not as immediate experience; but which con-
stitutes a very essential part of the given material of the
theologian. We mean history, the religious experience of the
race. In discovering Ritschl's attitude toward experience and
history, we shall expect to find many indications of the criteria
which he employs to distinguish between "true” and "false" in
the given material. History and Experience themselves, however,
are facts and not theory. It will be our next task to ascertain
the criterion of truth which Ritschl uses in his theory about
* *
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4the inner nature of reality. Such a theory we ordinarily call
metaphysics. At this point, our theologian’s use of terms is
curious and unique. It will be our double task to ascertain
what he means by metaphysics and how, in non-metaphy sical ter-
minology, he undertakes to answer the metaphysical problems of
his theology; and we shall always seek thereby to discover and
formulate his implicit criterion of truth. There will then re-
main his own statements of logical principles. We shall thus
be ready for the final task of formulating and evaluating the
criterion (or criteria) which we shall have found in our investi-
gations. Our original investigation will then be complete; and
there will be left only the task of comparing our results with
those of other critics.
In our discussion of the first main theme, experience, we
shall follow the order, first Ritschl’s criticism of other views,
then his own conception of experience; for our goal is the formu-
lation of his theory. And we shall discuss first the subjective
aspects of experience, and second the emphasis on the relation
between the soul and God, because of our principle of beginning
with the immediately given (cf. experience, then history).
a Ritschl’s Criticism of the traditional Account of religious
Experience.
1 The subjective Aspect of Experience,
cx The experience of repentance.
At the beginning of the Christian life, and to a degree, con-
tinuing through it, Luther and Melancthon, and, since them, par-
ticularly the Pietists, place an essential experience, the terrores
conscientiae or Busskampf
. (R. V.,III 3A.,153f; G. P.,I 36i, II 344,
III 43 etc; and R. V., I 155, 355).
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This type of repentance or penitence, Luther described as
consisting of "torturing feelings of the most extreme kind"; it
is not mere ethical repentance, but a crushing, humiliating
experience of worthlessness and inner corruption (G. ?.,I 439,
583, II 155). Luther found in this mental suffering a presuppo-





Ritschl rejects this experience unconditionally.
i He sees in it an anxious, legalistic method, exactly
contradictory to the real purpose of the Reformers (R. V.
,
I 361),
which could only tend to make faith pathological, weak and in-
secure (R. V.,III 155). It did not appear in Luther’s early
teachings (R. V.,III 158).
ii He finds it hostile to the conception of education in
the Community (we capitalize, in order to distinguish the word
as a translation of "Gemeinde" )
.
The terrore s are purely
"natural" emotions of fear and horror, of a type that all edu-
cation must seek to restrain, "in order to render it possible
for the will to tend consistently toward the good" (R. V.,III 157).
This very ideal was also held by the Reformers (ib. 160).
iii In the experience, he views the subject as passive, as
individually inspired by the Spirit. This implies indifference
to the general promise of grace to the Community as a whole.
Results.
In these objections, the Christian Community, its needs,
its history and particularly the ideals of the Lutheran Refor-
mation (as a whole) are the criterion over against the psycho-
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6Luther’s words to his meaning, from the real to the ideal. The




The experience of conA/^ersion has never been prominent in
Lutheranism. ¥any Pietists, however, from Francke (G. P.,II 251)
on, have insisted on it as an experience of sudden and ecstatic
joy {G. P.,II 257, 274, 583, R. V..III 148). Ritschl rejects it.
i In some expressions, Ritschl seems merely indifferent
toward the subject (R. V.,III 150,160).
ii He views the demand for dating the new birth, character-
istic of Pietists and Methodists (so Ritschl) as absurd (R. V.,III
618f ).
iii As against the ecstatic type, he approves Bengel’s ethical
conception of conversion, as a return to the principles of the
Reformation (G. P.,III 65f).
iv Kis argument (I a 1 ii) against the terrores on the
ground of the concept of education in the Gemeinde included a
protest against conversion.
Results.
It is clear that he does not rate conversion as a test of
truth, as a real experience in which one knows God. The Com-
munity (iii, iv) and not the individual is authoritative.-
y Religious Experience as individualistic.
The theological systems of Thomasius, Philippi, Hofmann
and Lipsius took as their starting point ’’the religious need of
the individual” and made ”1110 subjective experience the logical
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7Ritschl’s olDjection to such presuppositions are instructive.
1 The standpoint is likely to " comproirdse the objectivity
of the doctrines” (R. V. , I 642).
ii The history of the last three hundred years (cf. Pietism)
has proven that the principle is too individualistic to have
churchly character (ib. 643).
iii It is indifferent to Scripture; it posits doctrines on
the basis of experience and then "proves them afterward out of
the Scripture, come what mayl” (ib.).
iv It overlooks the fact that the real object of theology
is Christianity "as a movement common to all" (R. V. , II 7).
V Even Lipsius had to concede that Christ and the Com-
m.unity were necessary as norm and explanation of this experience
(ib. )
vi It has no protection against fanaticism,
vii It is a type of feeling. But, in at least one passage,
he rejects all feeling in religion because it is "indifferent to
will, reason, imagination and memory", and because it marks an
enervated faith (R. V.,III 151f).
Results.
The religious experiences of the individual, his feelings,
are in no sense a criterion. The only protection against sub-
jectivism is to be found in the history of the Community, and
its faith in Christ.
-
2 The personal Relations betv/een the individual Soul and God
(or Christ).
We nov; turn our attention to those aspects of religious
experience which view themselves as actual personal relations
between the experiencing soul and the divine Being,- G-od or Christ.
*
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8The enphacis or. love.
RitEchl*s chief motive in G-P*may he difficult to formulate;
certainly one element in it is his poleirdc against that form of
religious experience that moves in the spere and uses tlie lan-
guage of love. He contends that tiie mutual love of God (or Christ)
and the soul is a Roman Catholic type of piety; that its origin
lies in the writings of St. Bernard and the Song of Solomon. That
the Pietists viev/ed love for Christ the Bridegroom as the deeper
meaning of faith was a phenomenon for which Ritschl had neither
s^^Txpathy nor tolerance ( G. P.,I 192 etc).
Arndt \vas the first Lutheran to express the thought of love
to God in sentimentally passionate and sensuous figures, such as
that of the mystical marriage with Christ ( G. P. , II 42f, R. V.,I
357). The characteristic element in this, for Ritschl, is the
equality which it presupposes hetv/een Christ and the soul; a
mutual love, an interchange of affection which excludes any thought
of the exalted and divine nature of the loved one (R. V.,I 360,
G. P« , I 345, 436, II 25, 44 etc). God is "the friend of the
heart"; Jesus, "the sweetest." The language used was, doubtless,
often trivial, irreverent and disgusting (G. P.,II 63-93). The
cult of the wounds of Jesus led to love for the whole mutilated,
physical person of the martyred Savior.
It will be our endeavor to make clear Ritschl’ s reasons for
rejecting this ideal of experience in all its forms.
i It is Catholic, and hostile to the spirit of the Refor-
mation (G. P. , I 142, 490). "The Reformers invalidated the concept"
(R. V.,III 2=3A 560f).
ii Faith is a form of obedience to Christ and God. Love,
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9however, imj^lies coor Jinali on of I' uman and divine, which
e^ccludes the subordination of obedience (R. V.,I]I 171f. 560).
iii It is a practical denial of the deity of Christ; for
one cannot view one’s equal as one’s God; and further, it must
always have ’’the fairest among the sons of men" as its object,
thus involving a corrn^lete break betv;een the divine and human
natures in Christ (R. V.,III 2z3A.
,
367ff. 561).
iv It cannot be permanent. It requires high tension of
feeling, which must ultimately relax and be followed by a desolate
reaction (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
171).
V Finally, it is based on our unclear definition of the
concept of love. Love is, he teaches, a permanent wil], which,
moved by the feeling of the value of its object (spiritual
personality), aims either to appropriate the same or to further
it in its characteristic form of existence. This latter can
happen only when both have the same life-purpose. But, Ritschl
insists, even this notion of love, which is very different from
that which the Pietists mean, is not an accurate description of
the attitude of the soul toward God implied in faith. Love leaves
the question as to possible coordination or subordination of the
persons concerned still open; whereas faith necessarily im^plies
the subordination of obedience (R. V.,III 263f, Unterr.,9, R. V.,
Ill 2=3A.
,
560). This was the idea of the Reformers (G. P. , I 436).
Results.
Ritschl’ s main argument (i) is that the characteristically
Catholic is to be rejected in favor of the characteristically
Lutheran. He specifically rejects feeling as a criterion (iv).
A clear definition of the terms faith and love is essential
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(ii, iii, v), in order thst one moy underetono the i niplications
of the Cominunity teac/iings (such as the Deity of Christ). -




The doctrine of the witness of the Spirit has been one of
tjie historical treasures of Chri stiarii ty
,
and the experience has
been for man}'’ an essential test of the truth of the Christian
religion. In the dogmatics of Lutheranism it has played a signifi-
cant part. In all of t;ie forms whicn the doctrine has assumed,
our theologian finds one cormTion element;- the divine Spirit is
always conceived as active, the human spirit as passive (R. V.
,
I
354, II 2=3A., 22, 160).
Ritschl’s criticism of the doctrine is instructive.
i The doctrine is unthinkable. The essential mark of the
human self is self-assertion; but this doctrine represents the
human spirit as passive, as object of a mechanical activity
"without its essential characteristic of self-assertion" (R. V,,I
35b) .
ii It weakens the ethical element and so is one factor in
"the breaking-up of the doctrine of justification and atonement"
(R. V.,I Ch.VII, 347-363).
iii The problem as to "how one is filled or affected by" the
Spirit is insoluble, because lying outside tne realm of observa-
tion (R. V.,III 2=3A., 22).
iv The root of tne matter, however, lies in the fact his
definition of the Holy Spirit removes all significance from the
traditional doctrine of the testimonium . Ritschl's doctrine of
the Spirit is to be found as early as 1874 in R, V.,III lA.
,
61,
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(2=3A., 4G). In these passages, the Holy Spirit, God’s knowledge
of Himself and the knowledge of God in the Community are equated;
so also in R. 2=3A.
,
444, 502 and 3A.
,
57]. "ore specifi-
;ally, it is "the knowledge of God as our Father" (R. 562)
or "of the Son of God as our Lord" (R. 2=3A.
,
502).
The question arises as to whether this common knov/ledge of
God and man has in any sense a personal existence, is the thought
of a subject. The Ritscnlian answer is negative. In R.
1=2A.
,
562 the clear statement was made that tiie Holy Spirit, meta-
physically speaking, is merely a category or formal term, just as
justification and atonement, as judgments of God, are for Ritschl
purely formal. But even this statement was too "metaphysical"
for the later Ritsclil and he dropped it froiQ 3A.
,
at W. Herriaann's
suggestion (communicated to the v/riter by Prof. Herrraann). The
later phrasing is: "the Spirit of God is also an attribute
of the Christian Community as the power of the exhaustive knowledge
which is common to all believers in Christ, and also as the motive
of the life of every Christian" (R. V.,III 3A., 571f.). The Spirit,
he goes on to say, cannot be experienced by an individual in
isolation from others. Individualism would cause all manner of
fanaticism. No, the Spirit is precisely "the ground of the
cooperation of individuals in the Community", and it is its work
to guarantee "the agreement of the impulses (of believers, to
free activity as ciiildren of God) with tlie purpose of God, and the
likeness of these strivings in all individuals". Still more
plainly, it is "the conir:on spirit in whic/i the members of the
Community win their common knowledge of God and their common
impulses tov/ard the Kingdom of God and toward becoming children
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of .lod" (Un + err.
,
37, R, 501).
Prof. H. Weiss of Tul)ingen, criticising this concept de-
clared that according to it *’the Holy Spirit is in no sense
anything real or substantial.” Ritschl replied that Weiss used
"real” in the sense of ‘'something that must be asserted prior
to and apart from any particular activity.” This criticism is
unjust on Ritschl’ s part; but it reveals his own tendency to
find the only religious reality in tlie activity of the Community-
consciousness (cf. T. M. 71). With such a view it is no wonder
that he found the testimonium sane
t
i spiri tus something superfluous,
Results.
All four considerations are based on the activity of the
self as the only criterion of truth and reality. The testimonium
cannot be true in any sense that would involve the assertion of
the existence of the Spirit prior to or apart from its activity
in the Community (iv). The denial that the spirit of man can
be "object of a mechanical activity" (i) would logically involve
the denial of any real knowledge of the world in sense perception.
The criterion in this whole discussion is immediate, subjective,
active experience; only this is true or real, if Ritschl* s words
are to be taken seriously. "God’s knowledge of Himself" is a
phrase that Ritschl has no logical right to use, as specifying
something apart from the activity of that knowledge in human
consciousness. —
y Mysticism.
The term "mysticism" is so vague that it might be extended
to include all that we have yet discussed as Christian Experience;
or narrowed to exclude everything except the most abnormal
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use it here in s quite arbitrary manner, to designate the
experiences that Lutherans have associated Avith the term unio
s t ^ •
Ritschl distinguishes three elements in mysticism: personal
relation to God, contemplation of Kim, union with Kim.
By a personal relation to God, Ritschl means that conception
which views trust, humility, patience, prayer and gratitude as
inadequate expressions of the Christian life, that need to he
supplemented hy "a still converse of the soul with the Savior",
a "communion of prayer v/ith question and answer". The emphasis
on love (cf. above I 2 ) is one phase of this relation (R. V.,I
347, T. M,, 77).
By the contemplation of God, Ritschl means a state identical
with the goal of the Neo-Platonic philosophy (R, V. , I 360, III
2^:3A.,467f
. ) ; more specifically, "the contemplative appropriation
of Christ.
"
The union with God is the highest stage, in which, as
Zinzendorf said, "the poor creature becomes one soul and one body
with his creator, by renouncing his own free will" (R. V.
,
I 596).
In "the mystical union with God, the bliss of heaven is antici-
pated in a brief experience of joy" (R. V.,I 121) (cf. also R. V.
,
III 95, 2=3A., 108).
Ritschl waged incessant polemic against all forms of the
unio mystica
.
and for the following reasons.
1 Mystics are indifferent toward the history and the





fatal to sound religion, for in historical knov-'ledge we have our
only criterion of religious sanity and protection from fanaticism
(T. M., 77)o
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2 The experience is of Catholic origin ( G. P. , I 26); and
was not Luther’s teaching (R. V.,I11 96, G. P.,II 22). All
early Lutherans treated the u n i o nystica as the union of Christ
with the Church, not with the individual believer (G. P.jII 98).
According to Lutheran standards, it is "apocryphal” (R. V.,I
357, G. P. , II 21f
.
).
3 It is unethical. Firstly, because it is spasmodic and
erratic, whereas ethical principle must be steady and permanent
(G. P.,I 337); and secondly, it leads to a renunciation of the
will, whereas the will is the center of ethics ( G. P.,I 473ff.).
4 It is antisocial, as Arndt and the Anabaptists prove
(G. P.,11 47, 155). "It can thrive only in the cloister or in
the hermit’s cell" (R. V.,I 124).
5 It is otherworldly. It aims at salvation through negation
of the v/orld, it longs to be free from the world. Rut this
contradicts the Reformation doctrine of justification, which
demands a relation to the world, i.e. a mastery over it (R. V.,I
121-123, III 95).
6 It is based on the absurd scholastic psychology, which
asserts the soul- in- itself (apart from all activities) as the







Negatively the result is clear. No experience of any
individual, apart from the Community, can, of itself, be regarded
as a relation to God.
We find three positive criteria implicit in the discussion:-
first, the history and ideals of the Community (1, 2, , 4, 5);
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activity (6); and tiiird, ethical sanity (3). The first is, as
we have seen, Ritschl’s characteristic norm for rejecting all
subjectivism (cf. above I alo< .iy' 2 .
b Ritschl’s own Theory of religious Experience.
In spite of the fact that Ritschl rejects the traditional
formulations of religious experience, it is far from his purpose
to build up a purely objective system, out of relation to the
concrete facts of the inner life of individuals. Let us then try
to discover his positive conception, starting from the same two
general standpoints that guided us above.
1 The subjective Aspect of Experience,
cx. The Activity of the Subject.
In his attack on the testimonium spiritu s sane ti and the
unio my s t i c
a
,
Ritschl had occasion to assert the doctrine of the
activity of the human subject over against the scholastic psy-
chology. In all experience, the human self is acting, not acted
on (R. V.,II 6). In a personal life, reality pertains to the
spiritual causality, and to nothing else. (T. S/L.
,
55, 74).
Nothing really belongs to the subject which the subject itself
does not do.
Result.
The activity of the subject is a characteristic, if not a
criterion, of all true religious experience. —
Immediacy,
A conception of Ritschl* s related to the preceding is that
all religious truth must be verifiable in present experience.
He rejects every notion that cannot be experienced as untrue
because unpractical (T. M.
,
50). "A sound religious sense finds
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its suTDport in experien'^e” (R. 349). It is a fundamental
principle that "all theological propositions are valid for the
present" (R. V. , I 1). There should be nothing in dogmatics that
cannot be used in the pulpit and in the relations of Christians
with one another (R. 3A.
,
573). These passages are typical.
Results.
Here the criterion of truth is verifiability in experience.
As stated it is unrelated to the claims of history and of the
Community. ~
2 The personal Relations between the individual Soul and
God (or Christ),
After Ritschl’s decisive rejection of an immediate relation
of the soul to God (or Christ), it would appear that any relation
which he would concede must be mediated by some agency. And, in
view of the prominence of the Community in his thought, we should
expect that agency to be some aspect or aspects of the Christian
history.
cx As mediated.
i Through Revelation in Christ,
What sort of relation to Christ can one experience? Ritschl
says; "In so far as Christ, on the one hand through the historical
recollection of Him which is preserved in the church, on the
other hand, as the continual author of all Christlike influences
and inspirations in other men, is efficacious for the individual
believer, this takes place necessarily in personal and not in
impersonal form" (R. V.,III 558, cf. 514). And so the present,
personal, exalted Christ is efficient cause of human experiences?
By no means! We know Christ only through the historical tradi-
tion; the present influence of Christ must be stated as the
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influepoe of a personality, it is true —but the personality is
precisely a “form'’. The content lies in the history and in our
activity. It is one of the main ideas in T. M. that "the religious
connection of our life with God" is mediated by the accurate
historical recollection of Christ (T. M.
,
76, 77). Similar teach-
ings are to be found in Unterr
.
( 66ff ) . In other words, the only
Christ with whom we have to do is the historical Christ, as the
empirical occasion and cause of all the Christian history, and
as present in that history in the same sense in which, e.g., the
historical John Wesley may be figuratively thought of as immanent
force and efficient cause in the history of world-wide Methodism.
Result.
The accurate tradition of the facts regarding the historical
Christ is the criterion of the truth of all judgments which assert
a relation of the soul to God (or Christ). No experience guarantees
its own validity. -
ii Through the World.
It is a commonplace of the Ritschlian system that Christianity
involves a relation to the world. ”One experiences oneself as
an individual superior to the world in the real fellowship with
the true spiritual God, by testing the spiritual value of one’s
individuality through the mastery over all possible hindrances
from the extended, natural world” (R. V.
,
III 474). ”In Christ-
ianity one is religiously dependent on the supramundane God only
in so far as one experiences one’s religious freedom over against
the world, and confirms it in one’s world-view and estimate of
one’s self. (The form of religious experience) finds its content
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Here the criterion takes the form: We know that our Christian
salvation is fellowship with God, because in it we experience
freedom from the world. The experienced fact is the victorious
relation to the world; the relation to God is not experienced,
but inferred. —
iii Through the Community,
We have found that our relation to God is not an immediate
one, but is mediated through the historical revelation in Christ,
and through our relation to the world. But we should not know
God through either of these means, were they not mediated to us
through the Community. Ritschl accepts Schleiermacher * s concep-
tion of Christian experience as one "possible (only) in the
church, in spite of its prevailing entanglement with sin, in
which he distinguishes a personal and a social element" (R. V.,III
530, 532). For further proof we refer to the discussion of the
Community below.
Result,
The criterion of the truth of the fact that certain experiences
are a relation to God is the fact that they are experienced within
the Community. —
jS As immediate.
After the rejection of all traditional notions of an
immediate relation to God or Christ and after the proof that
Ritschl views all religious experience as mediated through the
Community one would not expect to find belief in any immediate
relation of the soul to God in Ritschl’ s thought. It is true
tliat his opposition to all forms of Mysticism grew sharper with
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the years (cf. G. P., Pab., 16 etc.). Against J. Kaftan, who
taught that "the life of the soul hid with Christ in God is the
heart of the Christian religion, the relation to the world a side,
a specification of this life in God" he waged an earnest polemic
(T. M., 69; Pab., 17; Th. L. Z..1881).
nevertheless, the thought of an immediate personal relation
to God is not one that a Christian man easily abandons. It is
c
if.iplied in Ritschl’s teaching as to adoption. "Inasmuch as ijlo -
refers to the most inward spiritual communion between
man and God, (it) agrees precisely with the normative analogy of
the relations in a human family. The fellowship which sinners
may have with God is as close as that between the head and the
members of a family" (R. V.,III 94). The language of immediacy
would scarcely be stronger. A Mystic might be speaking, when
he says: However much regard one may have for the forms of life
in the fellowship of the church "yet in the personal sanctuary
of tnia peculiar knowledge of God, of the world and of one’s self,
which consists more of states of feeling than of intellectual
reflections, one is absolutely independent over against men, or,
if not, one has not yet attained the enjoyment of reconciliation"
(R. V.,III 617). In relation to the faith in divine Providence,
Ritschl emphasizes again the purely personal character of religious
experience. Here "one comes to one’s conclusions not by observation
of the attitude which others take to the world, but purely through
one’s own experiences" (R. V.,III 583).
The editions of R. V. reveal"a steadily growing sympathy
for the need of contemplative faith in Christ" (Pab., 27). But
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whioii is overlooked in the act itself. Never-
theless Fabricius characterizes the changes made by Ritschl in
a number of passages as marking **an approach toward Mysticism"
(Fab., 80f,).
Re suit.
Ritschl’ s language regarding adoption, faith in Providence,
and the "personal sanctuary", as well as his partial tendency
toward contemplative Mysticism, imply an immediate experience,
independent of men (even of the Community) as criterion. —
II History, as being or containing a Criterion of religious Truth.
We have seen hints of an experience which is a direct relation
to God. But our prevailing impression is that religious experience
is not known as a relation to God except in so far as it is ground-
ed in tile history of the Christian Community. In what sense, then,
does that history contain a criterion of truth?
a Orientation.
Before we discuss the concrete aspects of history which may
be normative for Ritschl, it is fitting to put to him two
questions:- first, why he views history as essential to religion,
and second, what theoretical significance he attaches to this
essential relation.
1 Why History is essential to Christianity.
cx- Hi storical Founder.
Christianity has an historical founder to whom is assigned
a place in the Christian view of the world (R. V.,III 364 ff.).
That is, Ritschl teaches that in order to know the religious
truth about the universe, we must know the historical founder of
Christianity. He is "the center of the organization of tlie
a• *
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universe”, ”the exhaustive ground for our appropriating the
Christian world view” (R. 559). Further, "believing is
necessarily dependent on its historical ground, the revelation
of God in Christ and consequently on the preaching of the gospel
in the church" (Fid, impl,, 73). This second consideration leads
us to the thought of doctrine as tradition.
(9 Doctrine as historical Tradition.
A religion, so runs Ritschl’s argument, needs more than man’s
position in the world and the use of reason in order to secure
adequate foothold. If Kant had been consistent, he would have
had "to give uj) the standpoint of the mere reason and assume that
of historical empiricism" (E. V. , I 451 f.). "There never was a
’natural’ religion" (G. A. , II 175). This idea recurs often (Ch.
Voll., 17, R. V.,III 589, etc.). "Beliefs and feelings seem to be
’natural’ only because we are at once familiar v.dth and forgetful
of their historical connection." "Every social religion is a




Every religious judgment that is true in the Christian sense
finds its source in the Community tradition about the Founder.
—
2 The Problem which arises from the Relation of Christianity
to History.
We search Ritschl’s pages in vain to find any hint that he
has felt the scepticism of modern thought toward the security of
historical fact as a basis of religion. The only religious
difficulty that Ritschl finds in the contemplation of history is
in the question as to whether the delay through the ages in the
realization of the Kingdom indicates an imperfection in God (R. V.,
Ill 284). This problem cannot be solved by any empirical examination
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of the facts of history, and. further, the Ritschlian presuppositions
exclude any solution of the fate of those nations that stand out-
side the course of the historical development of Christianity
(R. V. , III 291 f . , cf . 591)
.
Result.
Ritschl is not av^are of the problems inherent in the relation
of Christianity and History, In so far as he realizes them, he
does not attempt a serious solution.
b Revelation as being or containing a Criterion of Truth.
1 Definition.
o< In the universal Sense.
The positive historical content of a religion is called
revelation (Unterr.
,
66). A definition of the term we find in the
essay ”0n the Conscience" (1876). "By the term revelation of God
we mean the particular origin of a complete world-view which be-
comes the conviction of a religious Community and consequently
leads many individuals to a common type of self-evaluation and
character” ( G. A. , II 182),
This is a definition of a general concept of revelation,
v/hich is indifferent to the uniqueness of Christianity. It is
purely empirical. But Ritschl does not view non-Christian
revelations as true. This definition, then, does not help us to
an understanding of revelation as a criterion of truth.
Result.
Revelation is what a religious Community believes,
—
5 In the Christian Sense.
The Christian revelation is for him, final and "concides
with God’s knowledge of Himself" (Unterr., 37, cf. above 12).
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In tne overwhelming number of cases v/here the word ’’revelation”
is used, we find it coupled with the phrase ”in Christ." Now
this final revelation in Christ is true because "Jesus judged
the inner unity of life, of which He was conscious, as the means
of the complete self-revelation of God" (R. 411 f.)»
Result.
The final Christian revelation is the content of the self-
consciousness of Jesus. —
2 Its Place in the Christian Religion.
CK. Essential.
It follows from the general and the specifically Christian
definitions that revelation is something essential for the
Community of those who believe on Him v/ho gave it. Indeed, "no
religion can be completely represented, if the attribute of
revelation is either denied or set aside as merely indifferent"
(R. V.,III 192, 508, 559).
Ritschl holds (with Luther) that "genuine and sincere
faith is exercised only in reference to the genuine revelation of
God" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
203). The exclusive authority of the









We have found Ritschl describing the revealed knowledge of
God in the Community as equivalent to God’s knowledge of Himself
(Holy Spirit). Such an utterance makes the impression of being
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extravagant and one-sided. A.nd yet we search Ritschl’s pages
in vain for any material limitation of its scope. He concedes,
it is true, that the fact of sin is known outside of Christendom
and independent of the revelation (G. A., II 177 ff; R. V.,I1I
311). He points out that the relation of God’s will of love to
our individual fate, hound up as it is with the history of dif-
ferent groups and of all humanity, is something which we can
scarcely grasp (R. Ar.,ill 591); if our religious knowledge is
identical w’ith God’s knowledge of Himself, this difficulty is
strange. But such limitations are exceptional. Christianity
is for him "the perfect knowledge of God" (Unterr.,!). The
emphasis is on the unlimited and final character of the revelation.
Result,
The Christian revelation is a perfect criterion of religious
truth, ~
y
Its Relation to Conscience.
In the essay "On the Conscience" (G. A., II 177-203), Ritschl
distinguishes "between the accusing conscience (pangs after the
wrong act) and the law-giving conscience (scruples in advance of
the act, p. 201). Both types, he admits, may in a sense be called
"the voice of God." On account of this similarity to revelation,
conscience has been considered "by many as of equal authority with
revelation. But, for three reasons, this view is untenable.
Rirst, conscience does not correspond to the general definition
of revelation (II b 1(X) . Second, the voice of God in conscience
applies only to the individual who hears it, whereas the founder
of a religion receives the Word of God with the specification that
he proclaim it to others. And tliird, conscience is always a
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result of the ethical education of the individual in the
Comraunity. The difference bety/een conscience and revelation is,
accordingly, greater than their resemblance, and it is impossible
to use the phenomena of conscience as the key for the understanding
of divine revelation or as norm of the peculiarity of social
religion ( G. A., II 183). In another passage Pitschl says that
there is "no universal ethical conscience" (ib., 192).
Now, the only unerring conscience in history, which did not
need to bow before any external authority is that of our Lord
Jesus Christ. It was in the strength of the conscience of Jesus,
not his own, that Luther at V/orms resisted the highest worldly
power (ib., 200 f.). The ground for this unique position of Jesus
is that He was conscious of a calling which required Him to




On the one hand, it is clear that conscience is for Ritschl
in no sense a criterion of truth. Revelation is unconditionally
superior to conscience, except in the case of Jesus, where alone
the two coincide. —
<S Its Relation to Reason.
Ritschl stands on Kantian ground in regard to the affirmation
of the rational possibility of revelation (R. V. ,
I
460).
i Rati 0 and revelatio .
But what is the relation of the actually given revelation
to the reason? Ritschl replies in the terminology of Scholasticism,
that the revelatio supra rat i onem holds true in the sense that the
former must be given and is not a product of reason; and that
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ntrri ra t i onem is true of reasorj as ”a corinecteU
view of the world” (framed) in f orris of knowledge which are in-





Whatever the criterion of religious truth may he, it is not
rational. —
ii The Rationalizing of Revelation through Theology.
In spite of the separation of reason and revelation in the
above-mentioned formulae, we find an attempt to bring the two to-
gether in theology. Revelation itself is, indeed, "not a system
of dogmas, but the merciful v/ill of God revealed in Christ" (G. A.,
I 91). But intellectual formulation is necessary. "The logical,
epistemological and psychological principles which make up the
ra_tj.^ or intellec tus (are forms) without v/hich the divine reve-
lation can not be understood at all, at least not tneological ly
expounded. (As Hollatz says), sin e rati one n ihil intelligimus "
(R. V.,I1I 23). But after alD, the theoretical form does not
touch the essence of the matter; "systemjatic theology - up to the
present - has been expressed in concepts which, as regards their
form, must arise outside the fact of Christianity, in so far as
scientific reflection about Christianity is, as such, no element
of Christian faith and life" (R. V.,I 616, cf. below IV b2).
Result
.
Theological, rational form is necessary, but this form is no
element of Christian faith or life, and so is no criterion of their
trutn or validity.—
3 How the Revelation is mediated to Individuals.
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er,sential element in Christianity, a complete knowledge of God,
superior to conscience and reason. If the revelation is so
important and so independent of the natural, spiritual and in-
tellectual equipment of the individual, it becomes of the utmost
importance to ascertain and evaluate the medium or media through
which the individual comes into possession of this revelation.
These are three, — the Community, the Scriptures and Christ.
cx Through the Community.
The iimnediate social environment in which the individual
stands and in which he finds the revelation given is the Coimraunity,
which ’’itself is part of the revelation, for ”no revelation of
God is complete, except when the believing Community is recog-
nized” (R. V.,III 520).
3 Through the Scriptures.
In the Community the record of the historical revelation
is preserved in the form of the Scriptures. "It is a fundamental
principle of the evangelical church that Christian doctrine shall
be based on Holy Scripture alone” (Unterr.,1, R. V.,II 10), Are,
then, the Scriptures the criterion of truth, by virtue of the
fact that the revelation is contained in them? We can answer this
question only by a definition of what Ritschl means by the inspi-
ration and authority of the Scriptures.
i Inspiration.
He rejects the doctrine of verbal inspiration, because in
order for it to have significance, an infallible interpretation
is necessary, and this can be asserted only by affirming the
testimonium spiri tus sane ti in exegesis - that is personal inspi-
ration (R. V.,II 5, 6). Ritschl rejects this conception absolutely
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itcelf is a subterfuge, for it is always "we who interpret the
Scripture" (G. A., II 22).
After refuting verbal inspiration, wc expect to find our
author giving sone definition of his own as to what inspiration
is. But instead, he tries to show that the specific advantage
of the IT. T. writings Ijes in their autnentic understanding of
the religions of the 0. T. (R. V.,II 10, 16, based on Alt. K.
,
232 etc.). "With tliia criterion", he thinks that he can "go
without a theory of inspiration for these writings, (so Tong ay)
one can actually distinguish (them) from all otl'iers in respect to
their superior value" (R. V.,II 17f.).
Re su Its.
The criterion of the inspiration of the IT. T. books is their
comprehension of 0. T. religion. This criterion is purely
empirical. It proves Ritschl's ov/n inspiration, for it presupnos
that he too understands the 0. T. Bo theory is necessary.—
ii Authority.
How far authoritative?
Rit3chl*s account of inspiration does not tell us how far
the Scriptures are for him a criterion of truth. We must put the
question to him in anotiier form. How far, v/e ask, are the
Scriptures authoritative? His only ansv;er to this question is
the statement that the H. T. is the only autiientic source of the
fundamental principles of the Christian religion (R. V.,II 18, 57
The Scriptures alone are the test of truth, over against any
"possible or probable success" (G. A. , I 54), "In tne Word of God
God is subject, in religiou.5 confession, man" ( G. A. , I 116).
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The Scriptures contain the essential truth of Christianity.
—
JlHov/ far qualified?
In the first place, Ritschl rejects the infallibility of
Scripture. Paul, for example, is not a good exegete (R. V.,II
308f,311.) and has Gnostic tendencies (ib.,314). In the writings
of James and John and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, he finds a
marked descent from the height of the thoughts of Jesus (R. V. , II
301). The R. T. has no clear and unanimous teaching, even about
such matters as the deity of Christ (R. V.,III 378).
In the second place, he teaches that the authority of the
N. T. is relative. The value of the N. T. can be expressed only
relatively to the later Christian literature (R. V.,II 12). The
N. T. is theologically inadequate, because Christian life in
C'atholicism and Protestantism has ‘'grown beyond the standpoint
of the i\. T. writers" (R. V.,II 25). Therefore the theologian
stands also under the leading of the doctrinal standards of his
church, because theology is in the service of the church (R. V.,II
18).
Result.




i Content of the Revelation in Christ.
Christ reveals "that God is love, and that His own final
goal and that of the World is the Kingdom of God" (R. V.,II 101).
The consciousness of the universal moral law was first incorporated
into human consciousness through the revelation in Christ ( G. A.
,
I











. >*! .•.•nudHi ^ 1.^ wii:iil -rrini^^ -^«t
10






.-, Hurt .tc Oifc’
«« 4iNi| *>"•*»• ^’3
tf imi*'* »^r .•ti/*i»‘i i)
•” •!*
.wr.-i'wx** " i •I^f !*«•» Jjo : '-'iriJ 6l -T *1'
®** ’ * • <''* » -‘^ iw' - jpsl^iXottif.o(!l












AMfie 1 '. ;• - X * < ® i
;;:' ^ 3??












rsm^j ni ltojL/»|tt|‘0S I * i3











The revelation ’’in Christ” is the only authoritative one
(cf. above I a 2, II a 1 , II b 1 ) . It is perfect and complete
(R. V.,II 13, Unterr.
,
19, cf. above II b 2 ) . It is unsurpass-
able perfection (R. V.,II 101). Jesus founds His religion with
the claim of revealing God completely, so that no further revela-
tion is thinkable or to be expected (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
367). This
revelation is the given and authoritative source for all theology
(R. V.,III 6, 192, 22b, 308; T. M. , 30, 47).
Result.
The given revelation in Christ is the ultimate and final
criterion of all religious truth. --
c Christ as Criterion of Truth.
Our study of revelation has led us to Christ as the bearer
of the absolute, perfect and final revelation. And as we propose
now to interrogate Ritschl as to his estimate of the person of
Chri st
.
1 Essential to Christianity.





202 and Melancthon). "The thought of God must
always be in connection witli the recognition of the bearer of the
revelation” (Unterr., 1).
Ritschl bases the abiding significance of Christ for His
Community on three facts. First, Christ is the only one who was
capable of carrying out His calling of founding the Kingdom of
God. Second, His life-purpose was the same as God's purpose in
the world. Third, the mastery over the V7orld has been given to
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Let us consider these points. Christ was the only one who
could found the Kingdom. Yes, hut we ask why? Ritschl’s answer
is simply, because He did; not because He was the only one who
could do it. ”If”, he says, ’’another could be pointed out who
were materially like Him in grace and truth, in world-conquering
patience, in scope of purpose and success, this other would
nevertheless stand in historical dependence on Christ, and so be
formally unlike Him" (R. 438). (That the supposition of
a person materially like Christ is by no means remote with Ritschl
is clear from R. V.,III 366, note 1). If this means anything, it
means that the material authority of Christ is derived from the
significance of the ideas which He embodied, not that the ideas
(revelation) derived their significance from His person; and that
His uniqueness lies in the chronological accident that He was the
first to embody these ideas and so found the Community, (cf. above
Hal).
The assertion of Christ's knowledge of God's purpose either
implies a mystical relation between Christ and God (which Ritschl,
of course, denies) or else places Christ's self-consciousness on
a level with the ordinary human conscience (which is not authori-
tative, cf. above II b 2 ).
Neither of the first two points, Ritschl admits, proves
Christ's uniqueness over against Mohammed. Each founded a
Community and each believed that he was embodying God's purpose.
But Christ alone possessed the "mastery over the world" (R. V. , III
2=3A.
,
367). Here, however, Ritschl’ s argument does not show
why the sinlessness of Christ is any more essential to religion
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Christ is supreme criterion of truth; His uniqueness lies
in the facts the Ke founded His Community and was sinless. —
2 The Significance of the historical Facts about Christ.
We ask Ritschl for his estimate of the historical Christ
and we are struck by his relative indifference to the concrete
facts in regard to Jesus, - both words and deeds. R. V.,II is far
more a discussion of Paul than of Jesus (see index). That through
the death of Christ we have peace is “an aesthetic judgment, not
a necessary religious idea” (Unterr., 32, R. V.,III b37f
.
) ; the
death on the cross was simply an illustration of Christ's obedience
in His calling.
His indifference to the history may also be observed in his
attitude toward miracle. Miracles are “effects which have not
yet been explained according to law” (R. 582). Christ
was “dependent on the natural laws that condition human life”,
although ”we do not know how far Christ’s power over external
nature extended” (R. V.,III 430). But in no case is miracle
inconsistent with “the probability of the systematic connection
of the whole world according to natural law” (Unterr., 12). He
makes occasional (but rare) mention of the resurrection (R. V.,III
1 A., 489; T. M.
,
57) as a proof of Christ’s relation to God or
as completion of His revelation (Unterr., 2=3A., 18). The virgin
birth he never mentions. Indeed, no historical miracle is
religiously significant, ”for everyone will himself experience
miracles through his religious faith, in comparison with which
nothing is more unnecessary than to speculate about miracles t}iat
others have experienced” (Unterr., 12).
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Bitsclil emphasizes, it is true, the need of accurate and
detailed recollection of the historical Christ in the Community
(T. M,
,
76, R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
377). Here, however, the total
'•Portrait of Christ" not the individual historical facts, is the
heart of the matter.
Result.
There are many details in the tradition about Christ that
are not essential to the normative Christ. —
3 The ethical and religious Interpretation of Christ.
"Wliat we recognize in the historically complete portrait of
Christ, as the real value of His life, attains, through the
peculiarity of this phenomenon and through its normative relation
to the purpose of our religious - ethical life, the value of a
permanent rule; because we perceive at the same time that we are
able to enter into His relation to God and the World onl 3^ through
the stimulating and directing force of this Person" (R. V.,III 366).
This sentence contains Ritschl’s attempt to mediate between the
historical and the ethical - religious elements. The stress is
not laid on historical fact, but on ideal worth.
Result.
Not the personal Christ but the Christ-ideal in the tradition
is here the ultimate criterion. We have only to "recognize" it.—
OCAS royal Prophet.
Nevertheless, he proposes to interpret the traditional
doctrine of the ••offices" from the point of view of Christ’s
self-consciousness, and so reduces the traditional three to two;
Christ is royal Prophet and royal Priest (R. V. , III 407, 415, 417).
Here he lays a great deal of stress on the validity of the history.
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Apart from the conscious purpose of His life, His sufferings,
for example, far from being our salvation, v/ould be either merely
indifferent (ethically) or symptomatic of sickness (R. 419).
How His purpose was to be royal prophet, to realize the ethical
rule of God (R, V.,III 421 f.)* His task was the founding of the
universal ethical fellowship of men as the goal in the World (R.V.,
III 423). Christ’s very obedience and faithfulness are of them-
selves proof that He is supported by God and the revealer of God’s
will of love (R. V.,III 425 f.). The ethical interpretation of
Christ involves the religious.
It is at this point that Ritschl introduces his theory of
the divinity of Christ. The attribute of Christ as royal prophet, —
His grace and faithfulness — are for the Christian religion
precisely the essential attributes of God. The correct evaluation
of this perfect revelation of God through Christ is secured in




AS prophet, Christ reveals God and so is Himself God (Unterr.,
35). Nevertheless, Christ the royal Prophet is divine only in
relation to the actual existence and success of His Community
(R. V.,III 437). “The recognition of Christ’s uniqueness can be
grounded only in the combination between Him and His Community”
(R. V.,III 438). If the Community did not recognize Christ as its
Head and Lord, then He could not be properly described as divine
(R. V.,III 259f, 393). This thought occurs in Ritschl’ s earliest
(Alt. K., 84) and latest (Fid. impl., 63) period.
Otherwise expressed, the divinity of Christ is known through
the confidence which the Community has in Him. So Ritschl













.? %pfnn%’\i;% H '^IJ ' . ’ t> 'td ( f . • i
f-t..^,- '.*<* n<i 9} Bmr 3i« .»<iTir>j riH wdll'
1 * %in -{ .i ni ,,9 ,n) iMt rttn






- >i« »5'> i :a1- uma ^>'» HI
.M.^ cn* ^o<. 7 * (,*.-•.- 1 . 1. ' > vu .fisjt.T . tS 5ri»a
•' ^ in.ti.. . '. I' a*«.giii ,v ^-vaA lo liiw
jjHBHjg * •j I) .j A wi 9t*f #1 'L-yfrim
''•M'W'TtA* 5#r4 Mtd. Jt0 %i »T
r|HH[|||||^|p|^ Mm idult)dd> %j<u i.-*:.. v.t? 'I'o ^lulfll* u
fiBt^^tSfsti '•*;?.t a;- 1.. - i i-iftJ/i/M? 1 a* aiH
i --'’r ,^:#!bi>0 ; > nr
. »ifi Vi»cis»®xg
91 ‘ V*.




/„*.i. hi f>'t 44 kiii'' t^^nac'io aA
.!jiiSE3
^' '* '
mt ii»o .vS 1 / • i jb:-!;;'
.(e^
T Cf ii** 1
1
*^ )»^\ 5 rt 4aa » 9^^ ”*^'^1101.^0X9*1
-i-f ••fO . ; l>» o tc **i 1 *4i* »' *’v^ ^
.
\r ./I}
' I" iK (M>Kl 9^ «NM^ «: vlgo 1 •^imuats
a,.:; uii.*'' Ion <r|| 1 !-»»«»**: iiU :i in,.V iR)
-.-i •
^.-rt 'iTi-.ii9 <: -*«aj {.-'Ja baaU






*r-t <jt juri i»i nTX-x Vi Jt# iiOifiW 90 /t9 £!. ),70 O
t0 .f«i -*‘1 t«.'Wi4 I* :> 9 .751U :»a59 ^qi#^ci
’..rf
35
of His benevolent goodnet-s for salvation" (R. V. ,III 1B=3A.
,
376);
"the confidence in Jesus Christ or in tiie Holy Spirit is the
recognition of the divinity of Christ or the Spirit, because such
confidence can be directed only to God (R. 3A.
,
370).
"An authority which regulates exhaustively all human confidence
in God has the v/orth of divinity" (R. V.,III 583). Whatever one
supremely trusts in one’s God; our "confidence" is the criterion
of divinity.
All doctrines of the two natures and the three offices are to
him an abomination (R. 371, 374f, 417). The fact of Christ’s
relation to God is given; we must renounce all attempts to explain
how it is possible (T. M.
,
57, R. V.,II1 426).
Nevertheless, he contends against theological opponents that
he does not regard Christ as a "mere man". It is true that he
had said: "As God sees it, this human Life is viewed as the final
revelation of God, because the good of the world, to which Christ’s
life is consecrated, is grounded in God’s purpose" (R. 437).
"This }iuman Life"; and yet Christ is not a "mere man", "for by a
’mere man’, if I ever used the expression, I should mean man as
a natural being, without reference to any marks of spiritual and





. But Ritschl thus
appeals to an involved theoretical consideration, an abstraction
which never existed outside of Australian forests:- a wholly
undeveloped man.
Result.
Ritschl views Jesus as a man of extraordinary purity and
constancy of life, who revealed God by doing His v/ill, and whose
"divinity" is know essentially in the trust that the Community
which He founded directs to Him with such confidence as one gives
.-•jr
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to God. Christ is the criterion of truth. We have only to trust
Kim. No metaphysical explanation of this fact is necessary or
possible. —
^
^ lJ2 statu exaltation is
.
Ritschl believed that the orthodox theolof;jy had undertaken
the nonsensical task of establishing an idea of God and Christ
wholly a priori and apart from experience; Hitachi himself always
started from the concrete, empirical reality. Consequently he
was methodologically opposed to the traditional account of Christ
in s tatu exaltationis
. A recognition of Christ’s post-existence
’’apart from, what He actually does for the salvation of His
Community is no faith in Him” (cf. R. V. , I 291).
The exal tatio must be thought in terms of the historical
existence of Christ (R. 383f.,433). It is the permanent
working of that existence (R, 406). Faith overlooks the
temporal interval betvreen Jesus and the present (R. V.,I 291).
Still more; faith does not regard Jesus as one who has existed,
but as one v/ho still exists (R. 378). This present existence
must be thought as personal; for the memory of Christ and the
thought of Christ as working in the Church must assume personal
form (R. V. , III 558)
.
Now Ritschl says that everything in the N. T. that goes
beyond the "practical meaning” of the lordship of Christ "belongs
in the realm of the that raises more problems than it
solves” (R. V.,III 379). Tiie query is whether Ritschl’ s principles
should lead him to place the actual present existence of Christ
in the scope of such y . First, his eschatology is very
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life after de^th is a mere appendage to his system (cf. below III
a 4(9). It is natural that his conception of the personal existence
of the exalted Christ should also be vague and uncertain. Second,
the exaltatio is "a mystery, which is recognized by the Community
as the guarantee that His life-purpose was not frustrated by
His death, but was completed.” The "revealed side" of this mystery
is "the recollection of His life-work" and His personal influence
in the life of the Cormrunity (Unterr., 20). This belief in
"mystery" is a piece ofyi^oo^i^
,
which appeared late in iiis thought
(Fab., 97). He was driven to it by his need for a living Christ.
Third, all positive descriptions of the work of the Exalted One
are in reality descriptions of deeds of the Community; so, the
recollection of the historical Christ, the present influence of
Christ (as ethically appropriated). The personal existence of
Christ is yy'(2^<ri^ ,
Result.
Ritschl is inconsistent in his treatment of the exalta tio .
At first he uses the empirical criterion of immediate present
experience, and seems to reject the that Christ lives v/ith





In 1874, Ritschl v/as hostile to the doctrine of preexistence.
It is a mystery, a "trutli - in - itself". (R. V.,lii lA.
,
356-358).
This attack was not repeated in 2A. Even in lA.
,
Christ, as
founder and Lord of the Kingdom, is eternal object of the knowledge
and choice of God, just as the Kingdom itself is; except that He
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he goes further: *'hy deducting the difference
(for God) hetv/een willing and doing, the formula results that
Christ has eternally existed for God as the One who for us is
revealed in terai)oral limitation. But precisely for God; as






the ci’iterion is immediate experience and that alone
Mystery is denied. In 2=3A.
,
he approaches the traditional view.
Mystery is affirmed. —
(3 As royal Priest.
The royal Priesthood of Christ is "the justified expression
of the fact that Christ, as subject of the perfect, spiritual
religion, stood in the closest possible communion with God (R. V.
Ill 447). He speaks of "the solidaric unity" of Jesus with God
(Unterr., 17). "Jesus undoubtedly experienced a unique relation
to God" (Unterr., 1.7).
This communion with God was nothing transcendent or meta-
pliysical, but consisted in obedience and love (Unterr., 17, 31-34
Result.
The criterion of trutli is the ethical self-consciousness of
Jesus. —
d The Community as being or containing a Criterion of Truth
Our discussion of Christ as royal propliet left us with the
result that His work must be thought in relation to the Community
of the Kingdom of God (cf. above II c3o< etc.) As Ritschl puts it
"If the founding of the Community by Christ and the justification
and atonement of sinners coincide, then the exposition of these
deeds of Christ is the center of a properly arranged system of
Theology" (R. V.,I 2).
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This Community has had a history. Is that actual historical
development normative for the present?
Now the Community that Ritschl means is not identical with
the historical Roman Catholic Church (R. V. ,
I
145). Yet Ritschl
finds it important to prove that the Reformation did not mark a
complete break with the past, but was in a sense the continuation
of the ideal tendency of the Roman Church (ib.). The actual,
outer unity of the Church was to him a real value. G. P. was a
polemic against all separatism (G. ?.,I 184, 356, 398 etc.) "The
unity of the worshiping Community is so necessary a link in the
World viev/ of the Christian religion, tiiat the division of the
church into ‘sects’ is a great hindrance to the persuasive power
of that religion” (Unterr., 70). The only actual unity is a unity
of development under Christ’s influence (R. V.,III 3A.
,
267),
Contemporaneous with this ideal development, is a development
of sin. The Community of Christ is composed of sinners, -forgiven,
it is true, but still sinners (R. V.,III 515). ’’The experience
of the power of sin in Christianity ... cannot (be) cast aside
simply because such experiences were unknovm to Paul and John”
(R. V.,II 378f.). In several passages, he expresses himself
very strongly as to the pettiness and sinfulness of the historical





599-609). He confesses that he cannot reproach Schleiermacher
”for (yielding to) the temptation to belittle everything which
appertains to public ecclesiastici Sim” . But - and here is the
Ritschlian solution of the difficulty—”! am conscious of resisting
this temptation”; for if, as Schleiermacher admits, men in the church
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are somehow seeking religion, that very fact implies a certain
possession of religion (Schl., 50f.). Religious experience is
"possible in the church, in spite of the prevailing entanglement
of the church in sin (R. V.,I1I 530).
Result
.
Not the empirical Community, hut the ideal tendency of the
ciiurch is the Criterion. —
2 As a social Institution.
Ritschl, with Schlei errnacher, viewed the social aspect of
the Christian religion as an illustration of the social character
of all spiritual, religious and ethical life. Apart from "the
social group", this life cannot exist {R. Y.,I 488f. ,491), for
ethical life implies relations among ethical subjects. Because
the Enlightenment had viewed religion from the standpoint of the
individual, Ritschl condemned it as inadequate (R. V. , I 387).
Re su 1 1
.
The ethical need of man is here the Criterion.—
oc The Community as Unity.
The Community is the social unit. But in what sense is it
a unity? Ritschl gives us two answers, the first of which we
shall call realistic-formal and the second nominalistic-social.
i The realistic- formal Unity,
"Justification or atonement ... refers in the first place
to the totality of the religious Community founded by Christ"
(R. V.,III 132). Predestination relates to the totality of the
"new creation", but not at all to individuals (R. V.,III 123).
The individual always finds the Community "existing as that
witiiin which he receives his character as believer in Christ"
(R. V.,III 576).
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The Corar-iunity as a realistic unity is here the criterion;
this appears in all A A. of R. V.
—
ii Nominal! Stic- social Unity.
But Ritschl also lays stress on the conception of the
Community as made up of individuals (R. V.,1II 132). He compares
the Community to an organism and to a family (R. 132, 90-96)
and calls attention to the mysterious character of the reciprocal
influences hetv/een the freedom of the individual and the influ-
ence of the Community (R. V.,I1I 545).
In this group of utterances, the coloring is nominalistic,
the emphasis is on the individuals (Fid. impl., 74). Fabricius
points out that this "Christian socialism" is a fact that re-
ceives constantly increasing emphasis in Ritschl’ s thought (Fab.,
16, 27, 35, 55 etc.).
Result.
Here the ethical- social nature of man is the criterion. —
jS The Kingdom of Cin.
Sin-opposition to the good- is not necessary, but it is
universal (Unterr.
,
21f.). On account of its social character,
the immoral 'A^orld of men is called the "Kingdom, of Cin" (Unterr.,
23). All human beings are implicated "in the immeasurable
reciprocity of sinful conduct" (R. V.,III 363). So far as sinners
are objects of redemption, their sin is judged as ignorance"
(R. V.,III 363).
3 The Relations among the Terms Community, Church and
Kingdom of God.
oc Community.
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ship of all who believe in Christ (R. 8 _e_t passim ) ; of
all who own Him as Lord (Unterr., 6b; H. 3A.
,
267). All
who belong to the Community are born again, are Children of God,
have the Holy Spirit (Unterr., 38). It is a general terra that
may designate either Church or Kingdom, or an abstraction from
both (R. 3A.
,
275; III 271, 407, 437, 455, Unterr., 68,
P. R. S., 2A.
,
Bd. 12, art. Reich Gottes ).
Re su 1 1
,
Christ is the one supreme criterion for the Community.
—
j9 Kingdom of God.
Ritschl compares the Christian religion to an ellipse with
two foci —the Kingdom of God and Redemption; the latter ’dogmatic’,
the former ’ethical’ (R. V.,III 11). Dogmatics views ’’all the
facts of Christianity in the schema of divine causality"; whereas
ethica, "presupposeing dogmatics, understands the realm of personal
and Christian life in the schema of personal activity" (R. V. , III
14). This use of terms is constant in Ritschl’ s -writings (cf.
1869 G. A. , I 109).
The Kingdom, although predominantly ethical, a deed of man,
is also ( subordinately ) a deed of God.
i The Kingdom in the dogmatic Cense.
In 1 A.
,
Ritschl said that "we can place ourselves only
temporarily at God’s standpoint", and that we have to think of
religion as ^hical (R. V.,III lA.
,
20f.). But in 2=3A.
,
the
Kingdom is "a direct religious concept", "a causal activity of
God directed toward men" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
30f.). In Unterr.,
lA., the Kingdom was the goal of the Community. In 2= 3 A., it
is the greatest good, guaranteed by God (Unterr., 2=3A.
,
2).
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Uf w w. carries it. into effect as the supramundane goal o f tiie World
(P. R. E., 2A., Bd. 32, 604; R. V. ,III 2=3A., 196). Tlie activity
Of God is given increasing stre ss.
Result.
In so far as the causality of God is emphasized. m.an has
only to receive. There is, then, no criterion of truth save
receptivity. —
ii The Kingdom in the ethical Sense.
Nevertheless, the Kingdom is also, even in 3A.
,
declared to
he chiefly ethical (R. V.,TII 11, 271, 301, 303, 317, TI 300;
Th. L. Z.,I col. 437). It is the Community, so far as its members
act out of love (R. V.,III 271, 275, 453; Unterr.
,




Bd. 12, 599 ff.).
It is in a measure actual (T. M.
,
47) but even its actual
presence is invisible, an object of faith (Unterr. 6). And it is
also ideal, the ethical goal of the Cormiiunity (Unterr., 2; P. R.
E., ib. ; E. V.,III 10, 196; Unterr., 43 lA. )
.
Result.
From this point of view, the ethical ideal of universal
love is the ultimate criterion. —
y
The Church.
Ritschl (G. A. , I 100-146) app]ies to the Church the same
distinction between the dogmatic and the ethical points of
view which was fundamental in his treatment of the Kingdom..
The Word, the Sacraments, and the Community life considered from
the point of view of God as given are the essentials of the dog-
matic-religious conception of the Church; this view (from the
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i The Church in the dogmatic Sense.
After 1869, this clear use of the term disappears. The
same criteria of Y/ord and Sacraments recur, it is true. In 1883,
he still says, "The unity of the Church depends on the pure preach-
ing of the 'Yord and on the lawful dispensation of the tv/o
Sacraments, and on nothing else in like measure" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
105). In Unterr., he "aimed at equilibrium betv^een the ethical




Bd. 12, 599 ff.). Now,
Unterr. treats the Word and the Sacraments simply as two of four
criteria of the Church (65-67); and concedes that the Sacraments
are not at the present time actual criteria, because the Lord^s
Supper is the slogan of party strife, and because there is no
unified practise of baptism (ib., 70). The dogmatic conception
of the Church no longer stands out clearly as a separate fact;
possibly because it included only the righteous in the Church,
v^hereas Ritschl tended more and more to recognize sin in the
Community.
Result.
The V/ord -and the Sacraments - are the criterion of God’s
presence. —
ii The Church in the ethical Sense.
The mark of the Church in the ethical sense is prayer, - the
confessing of God and Christ in religious activity (G. A. , I 116).
Contrary to R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
105 (cf. above i), he makes it the





The Kingdom in the ethical sense was visible only as "object
of faith" (II d 3 ii); so too, the Church in the dogmatic sense
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I 68-99). ’.Vliat is ordir-?^rily termed "invisible", Ritschl
calls "visible for faith", and contrasts this with "visible to
every observer". prayer he views as "visible to every observer",
whereas love is "visible only to faith" (R. 271). But
if prayer is ethical activity, wherein is it more external than
love? Prayer assuredly v/ins its character as such only through
the presence of faith. Perhaps Ritschl’ s motive for this utter-
ance was an increased regard for the worship and organization of
the empirical Church; although he still points out that the
Church is an object of faith only when one leaves "all tlie legal
forms of its existence (privileged clergy, ecclesiastical law etc.)
out of account" (Unterr., 68).
The Church is necessary to salvation. In a sense, this is
^ pe ti tio principi i . If it is, by definition, the Conruunity of
believers in Christ, considered from a special point of view,
then manifestly all believers belong to the Church. But Ritschl
calls express attention to the validity of the principle extra
quam nul la salus (R. V. , I 256, cf. also Th. L. Z.,VI, col. 627).
The Church is a necessary part of the Christian view of the World
(Unterr., 70). The problem arises as to how far this evaluation
applies to other visible activities of the Church besides prayer.
Result.
Prayer presupposes the dogmatic criteria. It is based on
the validity of the Word.
—
iii The Church in the empirical-legal Sense.
In v/hat sense is the actually existing Church, with its
legal forms, an authority for us?
Calling to mind the pessimistic judgment which Ritschl passed
on the historical Church (cf. above II d 1), we should be tempted
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to say that a man who condemned it so severely would hardly be
expected to make it his ultimate autnority.
Even apart from actual sin, "legal forms are not objects
of any value for religious faith" (Unterr., 68). This assertion
is precisely the peculiarity of the Evangelical as opposed to the
Catholic conception. Catholics view the institution as cause
and the Community as effect. For Evangelicals, the relation is
teleological, that is, "the Community of believers is final
cause and ground of the institution" (R. V.,I 202). He repudiates
the charge that he approached the Catholic estimate of the Church
(R. V.,I 318), and holds that believers need fellowship, but not
"the support of an ecclesiastical institution (R. V.,I 176).
The existence of a clergy, with special privileges, does not
follow from a religious need, but "from the earthly, historical





12, 599 ff.). In 1869 he had said that "law and religion were
contrary standards of human fellowship, which absolutely exclude
one another" (G. A.
,
I 1.34). For that reason, he would do away
with the word lieresy and with all legal discipline in matters
of faith (G. A. , I 121, II 18).
In view of this unambiguous depreciation of legal forms, it
is nothing short of astounding to note Ritschl’s entirely differ-
ent position in other passages. He asserts that the worshiping
Coimnunity "needs legal forras and ordinances for its own sake"
(R. V.,III 1-2=3A.
,
271). In an addition of 3A.
,
the legal
ordinances are made as essential as the worship (R. V.,III 3A.
,
275). Word and Sacrament, as objective facts, are essential to
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cius haB pointed out that the Lutheran ’’standards of doctrine”
gradually became more normative for Ritschl. In R. V., lA. (1374),
he had taught that the only source of the content of the Christian
religion was the N. T. In 2A.
,
he adds, “But .. the theologian
stands also under the guidance of the doctrinal standards of the
Church” (R. V.,II 2=3A.
,
18). Theology, he says in 1381, is
’’governed by the doctrinal treatises of the Reformation” (Th. L.
Z. col. 627f.). The creed becomes final authority (Fab., 90, 22,
42, 53, 112, 122; R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
182). Ritschl said, in a
letter written in 1883, that a chief motive of the revision of
K. V. was a "more pronounced dependence on the symbolical books”
Leben, II 410). For instance, in R. V.,III 60, we note: ’’Ritschl
occupies a rational position in lA.
,
which extends beyond the
Christian tradition; in 2=3A.
,
he submits to the authority of the
positive Christian revelation, as Luther and the creeds of the
Reformation (interpret it), and permits his theory of knowledge
and of values to be regulated by them and not by his reason”
(Fab., 101). This change of emphasis is partly due to a suggestion
given to Ritschl by W. Herrmann (as Geheimrat Herrmann informed
the writer. Winter 1911), to the effect tliat the philosophical
discussion was unsound and based on a misunderstanding of Kant.
There is, however, no doubt that Ritschl’ s tendency was toward
a greater sympathy vri th orthodoxy (cf. his late friendsiiip with
Kurtz, Leben II 447, and Tholuck, Leben II 291ff.).
By way of contrast, let us compare Ritsclil’s essay of 1854,
”0n the Relation of the Creed to the Church” (G. A. , I 1-24).
There, the creed is subordinate to the experience of salvation
(14); a church ’’without a legally fixed creed” is welcomed ns
comparable to the conditions prevailing in the first three Christian
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centuries (8); ''the Church has its existence not in its own
changing acts, but in unchangeable, divine deeds" (20); the
correction of the creed must always be recognized as possible.
In short, Ritschl had in 1854 a freedom of attitude toward the
creed which cannot be reconciled with his later subordination
under it.
Result.
In his earlier writings, the legal forms of the empirical
Church are regarded as foreign to religion. Later, the forms
(especially the creeds) are accepted as necessary to religion
and as normative.
—
S The Kingdom of God and the Church.
What is the relation of the two great facts. Church and
Kingdom? Ritschl is clear. "The Church is in no sense the




332). "The Kingdom of God
is indeed not hindered (by) legal forms, but is absolutely in-
dependent of them" (R. V.,III 271). Even in K. T. times, the
fellowship of worship was not identical with adequate brotherly
love (R. V.,II 301). Catholicism wrongly identifies the two
(R. V.,III 12). "The most significant activity in the service
of the Church may be absolutely worthless for the Kingdom" (R. V.,
Ill 275).
Nevertheless, in his later writings, he seeks to bring the
two nearer together. The paragraph added in 3A. at the end of •
R. V.,III 35 asserts that the one Community is "Church" (worship
and laws) and is gradually becoming "Kingdom" (love); the worship
is an opportunity for Christians to become acquainted with each
other, - a necessary precondition of love; and the love will labor
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for tlie extension of the Church (cf. nlso Unterr., 6). But
Ritschl merely assumes that true worship is present reality, true
love future ideal; are not both equally unattained as ideals and
both equally present as relatively attained states of spiritual
life? Ritschl’ s assertion can only be grounded in the extraordi-
nary identification of visible acts of worship in the empirical
Church with the necessary presence of the sincere spirit of
worship. To view worship as the opportunity for Christians to
meet and become acquainted is trivial and reveals the external
character of the union of the two elements. The contention that
love can work through the forms of the Church is perfectly sound,
but establishes no distinction in this regard between the Church
and the World (cf. below III d2, e3), and Ritschl himself teaches
that the legal organization of the Church is a part of the World;
so, too, must the acts of worship be (R. V.,III 332). This un-
sucessful attempt to relate Church and Kingdom was first formulated






Ritschl’ s original view was that the Church and the
Kingdom were both (in some sense) authoritative in Christianity,
but essentially different. The later attempt to relate them was
a failure.
—
III Metaphysics as being or containing a Criterion of Truth.
In asserting that truth is to be won out of the history - the
historical revelation in Christ and His Community,- Ritschl joins
one great stream of the Christian tradition. But parallel with
that stream, there has been another current of thought in Christen-
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in history, an empirical process, but also a relation to the
suprahistorical, had further held that Christianity has relations
with every other activity of thought that aims to knov/ the supra-
historical; and so cannot be severed from a connection with
metaphysic s
.
Vifith this tradition Ritscjil following Luther, as against
Thomas Aquinas and orthodox Lutheranism, intended to break. In
the abstraction of the Absolute he could perceive little or nothing
that inspired in him the cry ••Abba". In the metaphysical methods
and results, he saw no points of contact with the methods and
results of Christian faith. These facts are full of significance
for our problem; did he, then, reject the criterion of truth
employed by metaphysicians in favor of another sort of criterion?
Or did he leave metaphysics a certain field and a certain right,
while he simply viewed religion as a different subject-matter?
Did this division lead him to anything like a doctrine of a
double truth? And did he consistently carry through his rejection
of metaphysics? For these questions and others relating to the
subject of our investigation, we snail try to find and evaluate
Ritschl’s answers.
a Definition of Metaphysics.
1 Ri tschl * s View.
We have first to inquire what Ritschl means by the term
metaphysics; for few terms are more subtly difficult of definition.
He points out that he intends to adopt Aristotles’ definition
of terms (R. V.,III 16, T. M.
,
32), since he was the founder of
the discipline and has so largely determined its liistory.
Aristotles’ "First Philosophy" is "devoted to the investigation
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elementary knowledge of things in general (T. M.
,
5G). It is
knowledge a priori ; it determines the forms of knov^fledge in which
it is possible for the subject, in the stream of feelings and
perceptions, to have objects (T. M.
,
33). It is divided into
tv/o disciplines, ontology, the theory of the thing; and cosmology,
in which the manifold of things is brought into the unity of a
World (T. M., 33).
The characteristic of metaphysics to which Ritschl calls
chief attention is that it is indifferent to the distinction
between ITature and Spirit which Ritschl finds essential for religion
(T. M.
,
32f., 56; R. V.,II1 17, 227), Prom this observation, he
infers that metaphysics is necessarily a superficial form of
knowledge. Natural science and ethics are more v/orthful than meta-
physics because more specific, concrete, exhaustive (T. M.
,
32,
56; R. V.,III 16). "In scientific knowledge, the definite is
more valuable than tlie indefinite (G. A., II 213).
Results
.
Ritschl’ s definition of metaphysics and its relation to
natural science and ethics implies that the more general a concept
is, the less true it is; and the more concrete, particular,
specific it is, the more truth it contains. Then, all laws,
generalizations, concept.^ are really untrue; only individual facts
are wortlifuily true. Any explanation whicli goes "beyond" or "behind"
the empirical fact is not so true as the fact itself v/as. Cf. his
rejection of any theory of inspiration or of the deity of Christ
and his emphasis on present experience.
—
2 Rejected Definitions.
We shall understand better his definition of metaphysics, if
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we observe why he rejects other definitions, lie rejects without
ceremony the opinion of those v/ho "think that any scientific
definition of the idea of God, even in positive theology is
metaphysical knov/ledge" (G. A., II 213); so also the notion that
metaphysics is such a total knowledge of the World as would be at
once elementary (formal) and also final and exhaustive knowledge
of all existence (R. V. , III 17). But in both cases the rejection
is summary, without stated ground. He also mentions the Herbartian
definition, as stated by Flugel, that metaphysics is the attempt
to express the given facts (of life) without contradiction. But
this definition he finds indifferent to the distinction betv/een
ITature and Spirit; and to the Christian idea of God (T. V. , III
2=3A.
,
18). It is then no better than the Aristotelian definition
Result.
Again, the criterion of completeness demands the retention
of the distinction betv/een Hature and Spirit at all hazards.
-
b Ontology or Theory of Knowledge.
1 Definition.
Ontology is, as we have pointed out, that part of metaphysics
wiiich deals with the theory of the thing (T. M.
,
33, cf. above a 1)
Ritschl identifies it with the "theory of knowledge" (R. Y.,1II
2=3A., 16). And so it is "tlie definition or fixation of the
objects of knowledge" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
16, T. M.
, 57) or "the
use that one makes of the concept of the thing as object of know-
ledge (T. M.
, 58), or "the conditions of experience through which
the special character of the things is known" (R. V.,III 2=3A.,10).
Ritschl’ s concept of ontology, as made up of ruies of the
conditions of experience, contains no more than an incomplete
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2 The Theor;^' of the Thing.
Ritschl views three types of ontology (theory of knov'ledge)
as significant; the Platonic-scholastic, the Kantian, and the
lotzian. The first views the ohject of knowledge, tiie "thing in
itself", as unchanging behind its changing properties. But, says
Ritschl, the unchanging universal is, after ali, only "the retained
TTie/riory -picture of repeated perception of tlie activity of tlie
thing" (R. Y.,I1I 2=3A., 19), which is really less true than the
activity was. The second teaches that our knowledge is confined
to the phenomena; that we really do not knoxv the things themselves.
Rut the phenomena, he contends, could not be thought as objects of
knowledge unless there were some reality postulated in them. Ritschl
accepts the Lotzian view. It teaclies, as he states it, that we
know the things in the phenomena .. as cause of its properties that
affect us, as end whicii they serve as means, and as the law of
tlieir constant changes (R. V,,III 2=3A.
,
20). Ritschl clearly does
not mean to be a solipsist. In phenomena is something real, out-
side our knowing process (ib. 16). But it is equally' clear that
he denies the existence of "things in themselves" (T. M.
,
64) and
that he makes no ontological use of the Lotzian notion of activity;
he applies it only to psychological questions (q. v. ). The tiling
is cause, end and law in the phenomena, yet outside ourselves; rie
seems to interpret this as meaning that reality is in the relation
of phenomena. "We can rigiitly posit the thing as real only'’ just
as it stands before us in the sliafie of phenomenon" (T. M.
,
60).
The impression that the thing is one, he says, springs from, the
continuity of our self-consciousness in our changing experiences;
and the notion that it is efficient and final cause is based on the
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fact tliat we experience oureelvfcb ae such. Ritsclil did not mean
to use the Lotzian theory in the sense of modern Personalism;
nowhere does he make the inference that this unit^^, causality and
purpose which we think into things is auT^ported hy personal life
back of the phenomena and constituting their reality. For him tVie




Only phenomena are real. The criterion of truth is immediacy
in phenomenal experience, the fact of being "given". —
3 Its use in Theology.
Things are real in any sense only in their experienced re-
lation to us. Ritschl views the application of this theory as an
essential and justified use of metaphysics in theology. His
theological method, he says, depends on his theory of knowledge
and so is metaphysical (T. M.
,
66). His opponents are v^rong be-
cause they presuppose a false ontology, namely the existence of
things in themselves out of relation to the knowing subject (T. M.
58). The issue b-etween Luthardt, for instance, and himself is not
as to whether metaphysics has a place in tiieology, but simply as
to what kind of metaphysics shall be used (T. }/., 66). Previous
to T. M.
,
whichi his closest followers viewed as a failure, and the
strife with Luthardt (and others) which occasioned its composition
we find only isolated traces of this view. It was, however, devel
oped in connection with the discussion of the "two natures" in
E. V.,iii lA.
,
343-345. His positivistic ontology was not, tlien,
wholly new in T. M. It may be that he v/as mistaken in regarding
it as the foundation of his system. Yet one could hardly assume
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that the idea came to him ac a eodden revela tier and out of all
relation to his otlier thinking.
An examination of our previous results reveals that he has
applied tiie positivistic criterion in many fields. His doctrine
of the Spirit is based on the rejection of the sciiolaf^tic ontology
and on the assumption that only the experienced knowledge of God
in the Community/- is real; although, at the same time, he speaks of
"God’s knowledge of Himself", which can never be a part of human
experience (I a 2^); he rejects mysticism at least partly because
the mystical experience is so closely allied wi t?i the notion of
the thing- in- itself ns applied to t/ie soul in its relation to
the Absolute (I a 2 y) ; he views relation to God in terms of the
mediation through the historical Christ, the V/orld, and the Com-
munity (I b 2ix) - all phenomenal facts - although there are traces
of an immediate relation to God which transcends phenomenal ex-
perience (I b 2|S) ; accepting the value of the Scriptures for
Christian living, he renounces any attempt at a theory of inspir-
ation (II b 3|3) ; accepting tlie religious and ethical value of the
person of Christ, he refuses to attempt any explanation of "hov/
Christ came to be what He is", although he does make late in life
certain form.al concessions to the preexistence and exaltatio (II
c 3 entire); the whole scheme of Christian doctrine - justification,
atonement and the rest —can be understood only from the point of
view of the existence, tradition and life of the Christian Com-
munity v/liich performs all its functions v/ithin tiie realm of "possible
experience" (II d). Our relation to God, he teaches, cannot be
supported or explained by any reference to things- in- themselves,
"those pale and variable memory-pictures". but must be based on
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"accurate and full recollection of Christ". God deals with us,
so runs one e:xtreme statement, only through this medium of the
phenomenal history (T. M.
,
66).
Over against all this, stands the curiously contradictory
assertion: "Just as Christianity is neuti-al toward the differences
betv^een Jewish and Hellenistic ways of thinking, it is also, as
religion, neutral toward the different theories of knowledge, in
whicii its intellectual content may he scientifically expressed"
(T. M.
,
'^2). This means, taken literally, that the entire F.itschl-
ian theology has nothing to do with Christianity as religion; an
assertion which Ritsciil would be the first to deny. Indeed, he
believed that he was under divine protection, and that, if the
V/orld be not v/holly lost to evangelical Christianity, his work
would not be in vain (Leben, II 283, 282). Manifestly there are
"water-tight compartments" in his thinking. ^Nevertheless, we can
assert that Ritschl’s positivistic ontology represents one
characteristic tendency of his mind.
Results.
Any judgment, in order to be true, must be "metaphysical";
that is, must be grounded in a theory of knowledge; and must refer
to data of the world of phenomena, and not to things- in- them-
selves. —
4 Psychology.
We discuss psychology as a part of ontology, because, for
Ritschl, it is simply an application of the principles of his
theory of knowledge to the life of the soul (R. V.,III 2=.3 a.
,
20).
The notion that the soul is a thing- in- itself, a something ever
abiding in its own identity and changeless in the changes of the
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of tnc conscious life, he rejects (T.
,
5G ) . This (as Ritschl
cails it) scholastic psyciiology speaks of a reality which is not
present to experience, and therefore, according to Ritschiian
principles, is not real. The theory tiiat, hack of feeling, knowing
and willing, the spirit is a kind of ’Nature' or substance is a
useless play with words (R. 167f.).
He teaches that tlie essence of the soul is its activity; it
is never passive (R. 2=3A.
,
22). And so God’s influence
on us can, in the nature of the case, be known only througi. our
self-conscious activity, as aroused by the revelation and the
means included in it (ib., 22). The assertion that God is in
these activities of ours, is based on the fact that the outer
occasion of a feeling or sensation in us is always different from
the sensation itself; consequently tliere is an outer occasion,
God, for our self -ac ti vi ty in religion.
Results.
The soul is not a thing- in- itself or a unit, but consists
of activities. He did not see clearly tiie unity in the activity
of the conscious life. Every true judgment about religious ex-
perience is an assertion about our conscious activity. That is,
the positivism applies also in psychology.—
c Cosmology.
1 Its Relation to Theology.
Ontology has an important place in Ritschl’s system. One
would think that cosrno'' ogy, "in wliich the laanifold of things is
brought into the unity of a World" might also belong within the
realm of theological interest. Such is, iiowever, not the case.
He recognizes, indeed, that religi -n nas long been viewed as "the
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such s view who believes thnt Iveoplatonic abstractions from tne
World mingled with n few forms of the religious idea of God are
of equal value with the peculiarly Christian knowledge of Cod"
(G. a., II 214). The whole relation between religion and cosmology
is a matter of chance; and comes entirely from the fact that
"Aristotle happened to choose the term God to attach to the concept
of the final cause of the V/orld" (T. M.
,
34f.). Thence arose the
improper interference of cosmology in the religion of revelation.
The chief concepts Vv’itn which cosmology deals are the World
and God. We must note more fully what Pdtschl says about each.
2 The Concept World
Cosmology uses the concept 'World in the sense of the totality
of the Cosmos, but without reference to the distinction between
IJature and Spirit. But Ritscnl’s definition of terms is very
unsatisfactory; he does not relate the terms World and Nature
(cf. R. V.,III 474); and he speaks of tne World both as object of
cosmology and as obstacle for spiritual life to overcome (T. V. , III
434) without clear-cut distinction. The latter is imiportant for
theology; tiie former is not.
3 The Concept God.
Pitschl is relatively clearer in defining what he understands
cosmology to mean by God. God is Aristotle's idea of the world-
purpose, "the expression of the unity of the World" (R. V.,III
2=5A.
, 17), "the conception of tne first cause and the final goal
(R. V.,II1 2=3A.
,
205). Cosmology names the "World-ground" God;
but it is really the idea of the World which is posited as the
ground or rather as the causal unity of all things" (T. M., 37).
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"coBmol ogical" proof eetaLliBbeE only the unity of tiie World, if
it estahlisheG anything" (T.
,
36; R. V.,!!! 2=ZA.
,
205); even
if it could prove the existence of a \7ill back of nature, to call
that will God would he over-hasty (R. 2=^Z)A.
^ 208); it is
the great X, the endless thing, the aimless force,— hut not God
(G. a. , II 214). The metaphysical concept of God is neutral over
against e’very religion (T. V.,III 2=3A.
,
17). Prom the thought
of the unity of the World, one derives no assurance of salvation
(R. V.,II1 389). Any proof, to he satisfactory, must abandon the
method of cosmology and take up tlie religious idea of God (R. V.,
Ill 2=3A.
,
210f.), which v/as revealed in Christ. The Absolute is
no shelter in the time of storm (T. M.
,
43). The so-called "natural
Theology" is rejected because it is neutral and objective (R. V.,
I 220); it is simply a continuation of the teachings of Dionysius
the Areopagite, which really explain nothing and contain neither
scientific nor Christian knowledge (R. V.,III 258f.). It furnishes





The chief criterion for the rejection of cosmology is that
it does not furnish the Christian idea of God.
—
d The Christian V/or Id-vi e\T.
Instead of the traditional Aristotelian- ITeoplatonic cos-
mology Ritschl teaches what lie calls the Christian World-viev/
(christliche V/eltanshauung) . He does not name his theory a
cosmology. Eevertiieless, as the application of the principles
of his ontology to the universe as a totality, as an attempt to
give a connected account of the meaning of things, it might well
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the more, in view ct the fact that "every attempt to produce a
total v/orld-view arises from a motive of reli^^ious nature" (R. V.
,
III 2=3A., 197).
In tlie Christian cosmology, as in every religion, there are
three essential elements, ~ G-od, man, and World (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
29); "religion is in all cases interpretation of the relation of
men to God and to the World from the standpoint of the exalted
power of God for the purpose of the blessedness of men" (R, V.,III
2=3A., 185, 166).
1 God.
The idea of God is the decisive factor in theology (R. V.,I
60) and contains the real criterion of any theological system
(R. V.
,
I 61). The source of the Christian idea of God is tlie





The idea of God in the tradition of the Christian Community
is a criterion of truth. —
oc Love
God is first and foremost love. That He is love is no
hypothesis that needs to be tested or proved, but is "given" in







the only name of God
is "love" ( 11, cf. R. V.,III 268, oOB). In 3A. , it is expressed
as "tlie God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," but this does
not have the force of any change from the definition of God as
love; the Father - name retains love as constitutive principle;
the new element is the special emphasis on the fact of revelation
through the Son (H. V.,III 2=3A., 259f.).
1
Frank attacked this definition as inadequate. In the mere
....
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concept of love, tiiere is nothing eor.entially divine; nothing
to point out that love is the i ove of God. Eltschl’s answer
I'efers Frank to H. 2A.
,
263, where he had said, ’'God is
love in so far as He sets His life-purjiose in the hringing of
the hunan race to the Kingdom of God as the supramundane goal of
man" (T. M.
,
41; R. 266). "God is love" means, the purpose
of God is to bring the Kingdom to pass among men.
In accordance with this is riis fundamental definition of
love. It "is will which seeks, out of the motive of the feeling
of an objects value, either to appropriate the object or to fur-
ther it in its manner of existence". Four specifications are
added; first, the object of love must be spiritual personalities;
second, the v/ill must be constant; third, it must be directed
toward the known or assumed life-purpose of the other; and fourth,
it must take up the life-purpose of the other into its own personal
life-purpose (R. V.,III 263f
.
)
. In this sense, God is love and
"faith in His fatherly providence is the Christian world-view
in abbreviated form" (Unterr., 41).
Result
.
That God loves the Community of the Kingdom we know exclusive-
ly through the revelation in Christ.—
|3 Personality.
God is personal. The gods of all religions are spiritual
personalities (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
190); and the personality of God
is, as Lotze shows, thinkable without contradiction (R. V.,III
222-224). But it is not for these reasons that we believe in a
personal God. "Personality is the form in which the idea of God
is given by revelation" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
225). Our knowledge
that God is personal is not independent of our knowledge that He
%f '
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is love, but is sl'anlj/ t'ne form for the con ten tj (li* ''•;XxX 261)
.
That is, the personality of God is the necessary formal inference





The criterion is the revelation in Christ.—
y Wi 1 1
God is essentially will. might almost designate Ritschl-
ianism as a system of voluntaristic metaphysics. But this volun-
tarism is only an inference from the revelation that God is love;
for love means the will of love (R, 268f.). This is an
analytical judgment in which revelation furnishes the subject;
other such analytical judgments are the assurance that the will
of God is constant (R. 284, 308); the statement that "we
attribute states of feeling to God" (R. V.,III 305); and that
"the unity of the divine will is the inviolable condition of all
confidence in God" (R. 445).
Result
.
The only criterion of truth about God is the revelation,
whicli itself is assumed, and needs no proof.—
S Knowledge.
Ror Ritschl's view on tiie knowledge of God, we cite his
doctrine of the Holy Spirit (cf. above I a 2 ), where the knowledge
of God in the Community and God’s knowledge of Himself are equated
(R. V.,III 571f.); it is, in otlier words, identical with the content
of revelation. In accordance with tiiis, Ritschil the positivist
is able to make what one would ordinarily terra metaphysical state-
ments about God, "Hot only is God sure of His purpose and His
World-plan, but (He also) .. experiences at every point (of its
development) t}ie realization of the whole" (R. V.,III 287f.).
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Ho ;a]so his trentment of divine prescience (R. '’.,111 117]; and
he is able to speak of "the synthetic form of God’s jud^jinent in
regard to justification" (R. V.,!!! 16 title). Indeed, every
judgment that does not relate to phenomena, every judgment about
God, is in defiance of his positivism and is metaphysical.
Resu 1 t s
.
Revelation is here the criterion of truth. Put it is in-
consistent -vith his positivism; for he clearly states that the
living God must be distinguished from His purposes and His
creatures (R. V.,!!! 471), and so essentially admits a God- in-
Himself .
—
6 Relation to the World.
Ritschl’s idea of God is not for him a necessary result of
the contemplation of our position in the World (R. 508).
The World is not a revelation of the divine nature. Indeed,
Ritschl believes that an objective observation of the course of
events reveals so much that appears purposeless, that one might
be tempted to believe, with the Greeks, "in the envy or indiffer-
ence of the gods" (R. ’'.,111 584). The belief in the providence
of God is no law of the phenomenal World which can be reacned
through induction. God is not in the World, but outside it; and
has little contact witli it, so one would infer. Here we have the
deistic view of God, as implied also in the sharp separation be-
tween Nature and Spirit, to which we have often called attention.
This deism is, in a sense, scepticism; for no God is to be seen
in the course of Nature.
Therefore v/e are quite unprepared for anotliei' and quite dif-
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to vvnich Ritschl is led by his Christian aoc trine ot the providence
of God (R. 585). Here he explains the V/orld out of the will
of God (R. 264). God is Ruler and Upholder of the 7/orld
(ib., 353) and the Christian cannot viev/ God's 'Yorld with indif-
ference. Tlie fact that God is Rather iinplies that he is first
cause and final goal of the World (R. 2=3A.
*
205). Every
individual changing detail is willed by Him (H. V.,!!! 116; "noth-
ing that comes to the divine Spirit is originally foreign to Him;
He needs to appropriate nothing; every thing that the World means
for Him is fundamentally an expression of His ov/n self-activity,
and what comes back to Him in the progress of things, He knows
as the course of the reality which is possible only through Him"
(R. 224). Here v/e iiave expressions of the divine immanence,
verging almost on the pantheism that he condemns (R. 201,
Schl. )
.
Erom a still different point of view, he attempts to bring
God into some sort of relation to the World. Nothing, he asserts,
can explain the facts of our experience except the religious idea
of God. Even tiieore tical, scientific knowledge has to recognize
the reality of Spirit as well as of Nature, and the validity of
the peculiar lav/s of each realm; and so it must recognize the
religious instinct as fact. But its demand for unity leads it to
undertake further to discover the lav/ underlying the coexistence
of these different kinds of reality — Nature and Spirit — in the
same V/orld. Reason demands an explanation, and yet can find none
except in the assumption of the Christian idea of God. Up to
this point, all three A A. of R. V. agree (III 211-215). But 1 A.
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chnrf.cter of theology and ite relation to the ether sciences. 2A.
v/eakens the scientific charactei- of the proof, and 5A. not only
expressly denies the tiieoreti cal nature of this proof (ih., 214),
hut al.50 asserts that if the step of using the Christian idea of
God for the explanation of the World were not taken, the religious
(practical) faith in God would not he hindered (ih., 213); whereas





The deistic viev? results from the contemplation of phenomena.
There the criterion is positivistic. In the emphasis on immanence,
the criterion is the Christian idea of God, that is, revelation
as to the relation of the scientific view of the World to the God
of Christianity, Ritsciil taught, in lA.
,
that the former must
use tlie latter as explanation of the World, or else that we must
renounce the possibility of theology; in 3A.
,
he taught that the
revealed idea of God was independent of all need of contact with
the science of the World. In lA.
,
the criterion was the inner





Ritschl offers two quite different estimates of the
significance of the World, corresponding to his deistic and his
theistic conceptions.
On the one hand there is the view that the V/orld is something
q’.’.ite indifferent and external; a something whose use is "to
he overcome", not to he understood or appreciated. "Nature follows
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of it, and hinders it'* (H. 213). It is the business of
religion simply to assert the independence of Spirit over against
pature (R. V.,II1 2=3A.
,
17). The 3'orld is our foe, which we must
master and from which we m’ist be free (R. 431, 575).
Ritschl’s emphasis on evils is in accord with this aspect of
his system. By natural evil, he means "any such working of
mechanical causes as either makes our physical organism wholly or
in part unserviceable for its object of executing our purposes,
or disturbs or destroys our ability to use the legitimate means
for our ends"; and by social evil, the disturbance of our freedom
or of the intended consequences of our action "through the acts
or judgments of other men" (R. V.,III 244). But since social
evil always works on us through natural causes, all evils are
events in Nature (R. V.,III 333). They are a hindrance to our
freedom, but can nevertheless be overcome in our communion with
God (R. 333 ff., 595). Yes, the very essence of Christ-
ianity is the overcoming of these evils (R. V.,III 476).
There is, it is true, another side. Ke holds tnat the re-
lation to the World is not accident, but substance in religion
(R. V.,II 2=3A.
,
17). He recognizes, too, a divine teleology in
the evils of Nature (R. V.,ITI 388). He concedes that the World
serves trie purposes of making social life and exc'nange of thought
possible (R. V.,III 473), Nature is to be interpreted wholly as
a means to the end of spiritual life (R. 211f.). The goal
of the World is "the bringing forth of the World of spirits"
(R. V.,III 265f,), and of producing tlie JCingdom of God.
But after all, this attributing of a positive purpose to the
World does not do justice to the demands of the idea of immanence,
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out. of which, as implied in the Christian revelation, it doubtless
arises. The 7/orld shall, indeed, serve to bind men together in
tiie Kingdom; but of the idea that it also serves to bind men
directly to God and that He lives and moves in all the processes
of bh^ture - that the World is a revelation of God — we find as good
as nothing at all. Revelation lies wholly in the past.
Result
.
Both attitudes toward the World seem to be dictated wholly
by Ritschl’s conception of the content of revelation. The World
itself is no revealer of religious truth. The hostile attitude
tov/ard the World as something to be overcome may imply man's
ethical nature as criterion. •—
3 lian.
ocHis Position in the \7orld.
The third element in Ritschl’s world-view is man, Man finds
himself in the World, on the one hand as a part of Mature, de-
pendent on its limits, hindered by environment; on the other as
independent, free Spirit (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
189f.). To accept,
with D. F. Strauss, the fact of the natural mechanism as ultimate,
and to view religion as the consciousness of a merciful oil in
the world - macxiine is no comfort and no .solution of the problem
R. V.,III 584f.). "The self-consciousness of man, over against
the whole V/orld is the final answer to every merely mechanical
V/orld-view" (R. V.,III 586), Ritschl formulates this situation
by asserting that, although man is a part of the y/orld, yet he
is a unity over against the vvhole World and worth more than it
(R. 472 f., Unterr., etc.).
Result
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raechanica?L viev'^s, and so is a criterion of the truth of the
Christian view. This line of thought is based on a rational ethics
and not on revelation. —
|9His Mastery of the World.
The Spirit’s self-assertion over against Ilature, to which
we have had frequent occasion to refer, Ritschl calls "Mastery of
tile World". Ke concei\-es of it as being expressed in faith in the
fatherly providence of God, humility, patience and prayer (Unterr.,
41-45 etc.); which is equivalent to Christian Perfection (Ch. Voll.
,
10). As tlie presence of prayer in the list suggests, the mastery
of the World is essentially religious.
Considered from one point of view, it is the experience of
eternal life (R. 477, 684, 2=3A.
,
94), which also implies
the continued existence of the spiritual life in an adequate body
in the life after death (R. V.,III 575), although our conceptions
of that life must be indefinite, because the scriptural data are
indefinite (Unterr., 62).
Considered from another angle, it is blessedness in the
possession of the "greatest good". Fabricius has shown that the
increasing stress on this thought marked a tendency toward eudae-
monisrn in ethics (Pab., 29 etc.). 2=oA. make "God, the World
and Blessedness" in three main elements in all religion; whereas
1 A. had formulated them as "Idea of God, World-view and Self-
estimate" (R. V.,III 27). The later editions go so far as to
assert specifically that this mastery over the World grounds the
possibility of activity in the Kingdom. Tliat is, feeling is rated




"Mastery of tlie V/orld" is thought as predominantly emotional
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fhuir.ility, patience, tloaseclnesc ) , In later years it is put
prior to the ethical Kingdom. Here feeling, in some sense, seems
to be a criterion of truth.—
IV Logic.
We have followed Ritschl in his treatment of the data of
experience and nistory, and of tne theories of metaphysics; we
have undertaken to determine according to what criteria of truth
he judged the religious truth of this material. We turn now to
his own exposition of the methodological and logical principles
which he intended to follow. It will be our aim to formulate
these principles as clearly as possible and then to pass on to
the evaluation of our results.
a Presuppositions.
There are two characteristic presupposi tions of all Ritsclil’s
thinking to which we desire to call attention; one formal, and
one personal.
1 Formal.
Any judgment to be true must be formally correct; it was
^itschl’s feeling that theology had suffered greatly from loose
thinking. He felt it as his mission to clear the air, to insist
that every religious truth must be expressed in logically under-
standable forms of thouglit. For the ortliodox argument "that what
was impossible with men was possible with God" he felt only
contempt. Thus one could prove all sorts of nonsense (R. V.,III
233). Theologians must si)eak a human language. If we talk of
Christ in forms of knowledge whicii are applied to no other object,
then we make Christ simply incomprehensible (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
440).
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theology is one of Kitschl’s favorite themes- Accuracy in
scientific terminology is not a matter of indifference (R. V, ,
I
251, III 409). 'ye may view his positivistic ontology, with its
reaction against the mysteiies of mystical and speculative theology,
as a typical illustration of this trait (cf. R. 2=3A., 23),
and may also point to his principle that ’’the formulae of theology
are valid for the xjresent." In a sentence, ’’the scientific
knowledge of the separate truths of Christianity depends on their




Correctness and clearness of definition is a formal element
in the criterion of truth.—
2 Personal.
^One must further, he insists, have inner sympathy for and
appreciation of theology before one can think or write intelligently
about it (R. V.,III 390 etc.).
Result.
Feeling is an element in the criterion of the truth of
Christianity.
—
b The tv;o Types of Knowledge, scientific and religious;
1 Di stingu i .shed from each other, with Respect to
cxThe logical Conditions of Knowledge.
Ritschl’s statement of logical principles turns on tlie
distinction betv^een scientific and religious knowing.
It v/as not Ritschl’s task to define the logical conditions
of scientific knowledge. He simply presupposes acquaintance with
the methods of science. Only incidentally does he cnaracterize
it as demons tj’able
,
unified and simple, reasonable, i.e., "con-
L
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with itself and Y/i lii
R. 210, I 653).
Over against scientific kno?/ledge is the realm of religious
knowledge (R. 2=3A.
,
439). For it, proof and demonstration
are unnecessary and impossihle (R. V.,T, 590, III 2=3A.
,
210).
Religious knowledge or faith is, as Ritschl showed most fully in
Fid. impl., not an imperfect genus of the species knowledge (ib.,
69f. etc.) but is an altogether different type of certainty from
the theoretical.
Result.
In the case of scientific knowledge, logical form is the
criterion of truth: whereas the certainty of religious knowledge
springs from some source outside the realm of logic and cannot be
established by logical methods.—
(S The etliical Conditions of Knowledge.
Scientific knowledge is free from ethical considerations;
it is neutral, objective, disinterested (cf. R. V. , I 220, III
2=3A.
,
195). It is not, indeed, absolutely disinterested.
Without some sort of interest, men do not trouble themselves about
anything whatever (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
195). But this interest is
merely attention, in the psychological sense(R. Y.,III 98). It
does not spring from ethical motives nor lead to ethical results;
does not move the will to appropriate goods or to avoid evils
(R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
195). It proceeds cold-bloodedly and abandons
all reference to the practical consequences of the theory in
question (R. V.,III 2=3A., 34). All such knowledge has the
peculiarity of subordinating ethical interest to pure knov/ing
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Religious Vnowledge on th»^ other hond is in every detoil
precisely the opposite. For it, tiiere is no neutral, objective
lcno\vledge ; a disinterested, metaphysical knov/ledge of God "implies
an ethical fault on the part of the knowing subject, namely a
lack of confidence in God"(R. V.,I 220). If a judgment about
God is to have value as knov/ledge, it must be "supported by"
confidence in Him (R. V.,II1 219). The religious knowledge of
God is precisely this confidence, an ethical attitude. In
teacning tliat "unconditional confidence" is the only knowledge
of God, Ritschl believes that he is reviving the true meaning of
Luther’s teaching (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
6). The attempt to ground
religious knowledge on any other foundation is simply hostile to
trutli (R. V.,III 2=5A.
,
203). In all religions the norm is
practical and ethical (R. V. , III 3A.
,
186). \?e cannot, then,
understand dogmas as religious truth outside of "the activity of
the subject in which he receives the influence of God and a])plies
it for his salvation" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
34).
This''confidence" is, without doubt, an act of the will and
so ethical. Now the denial of any disinterested, objective
grounding of religious knowledge seems to make this "confidence"
something very subjective. And yet, in all A A. of his great
work, Ritschl calls attention to the fact tiiat ethical willing
cannot win us the means of the mastery of the World (R. V. , III
473). This v/ould lead us to inquire whether religious knov/ledge
does not include something more than the mere subjective-ethical
state of confidence. An examination of the passages vdiich we
discussed above reveals the fact that the context points clearly,
in each case, to the revelation of God in Christ as the object of
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the universal concept of religion, not the Christian concept, is
the subject under consideration. "Confidence" means, then, the
unconditional ethical acceptance of the revelation, without
reference to rational considerations. Our interpretation is
supported by Eitschl's final definition of faith: "Faitii in
Christ means that we appropriate tiie value of the love of God
v/hich is revealed in Clirist's v/ork for our reconciliation \vith
God through tiie confidence triat we display in Christ when vie
submit ourselves to God as His and our Father; in this fact we
are certain of eternal life and blessedness" (R. 3A.
,
558).
Any interpretation of Ritschl whicli would overlook the
reference of his religious knowledge to the revelation is unfair
to his plain meaning.
Result.
Religious knowledge renounces the objectivity of science, and
finds its peculiar method in ethics. A criterion of the truth
of religion is the ethical sp)irit of confidence directed toward
the God revealed in Christ. We note, as an assumption implicit
in this position, that the revelation is presupposed as absolutely
given, so that no manner of "objective knowledge" is necessary
for establishing it. From this infer tliat the revelation is
the final criterion, absolutely superior to reacon and to all
human ethics; "confidence" is, after all, not a criterion, but
only the subjective means of appropriating the revelation; for
tiie confidence itself is indicated in the revelation as the manner
of approach to God. —
^
The psyciiologi ca 1 Conditions of Knowlecige.
Just as scientific knowledge is ethically indifferent, so is
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It is disinterested (R. 2=3A. , 34).
Religious knowledge, hov/ever, recognizes tlie psychologies!
factors. Ritschi, indeed, is careful to limit the realm of feeling
in religion. "A merely sy chologi ca 1 definition of religion,
especially the interpretation of religion exclusively in terms
of feeling, is no solution, but a mere abbreviation, of our
problem" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
188). Each of the three functions,
knowing, willing and feeling is necessary, and no one is more
fundamental than any other (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
169). But feeling
cannot be dispersed vritli;- because it is the form of cur selfhood
(ib., 194), because the will is affected through the feeling that
a thing is worth desiring or destroying (ib.), and finally because
feeling cannot be reduced to knowing, nor be expected to submit
to its law (ib., 200). And so he comes to quote with approval
Calvin’s definition of faith as "the emotional persuasion of the
connection between the dispensations of divine will and the most
specific interests of man" (ib., 98); Ritschl’s own definition
comibines the emotional element with the consciousness of forgivenes
of sins (ib., 104f
.
) ; but through the stress that he lays on the
educative function of the Community, he insists that feeling be
ordinarily of the steady, constant type (ib., 564f.). It is note-
worthy that lA., 5C6f. contained no reference to feeling in this
context; and that 2A. included the sentence: "If .. every believer
should act with strong emotion every minute, then there would be
no peace in the Community" (Fab., 26), which 3A. dropped in favor
of a stronger emphasis on feeling.
The passages which we have so far quoted are from R. V.,III
2=3A.
,
to which the emphasis on feeling is ciiiefly limited. But
there are other hints of it. The only reliable subjective argument
I
foi- the existetiCe of God he fiouti in our need for iiarmony between
ourselves and the V/orld (R. V.
,
I 462). Even if religion arises
from "a need of the human heart, " as Feuerbach points out, so
does Katural Science, too, grow out of ”a need of the human reason"
(R. V.,II1 582), and so religion, as aspect of the assertion of
the entire personality (R, V.,III 2=oA.
,
98) is no more unreasonable
than reason itself. But this is inconsistent with the position
that science is free from psychologi cal considerations; and does
not presuppose the standpoint of the Community and revelation, but
of the human personality as such.
In one pa.ssage, as early as 1374, Ritschl seems to give feeling
a rank higher than knowing, in saying that unclear mental states
have more religious value than clear-cut ideas; feeling is the




Feeling or emotion is an essential aspect of all religious
knowledge and is in some sense a criterion of religious truth, for
what satisfies the demiand of the heart is true. In 2=3A.
,
Ritschl
laid miore stress on it tiian before.—
§ The Object of Knowledge.
Ritschl’ s portrayal of the methods of scientific and religious
knowledge is calculated to produce the impression that the two
types have absolutely no relation to each other. He undoubtedly
means to have his readers draw this inference, so far as the
subjective conditions ai-e concerned (although he does try to find
common elements, "attention", "need of human life"). The question
migiit arise, why, tnen, -ny reference to the foreign topic of
4'I
r -«j,rrf.4 — r"*' '•9; i* - ’‘hv- -T;^"’.
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scientific knovrledge in n t)Ook ?:;.ich ti-ents of its antipodes?
Ritsciil re. lies (not altogether frankly), "Collision betv/een the
tv/o is possible because both refer to the same object, the V/orld."
(K. 2=3A.
,
193); or "Because both religion and philosophy
intend to produce a ’'"iew of the Y/orld as a totality" (ib., 197),
whereat to wish to know a totality is a T)urely religious motive
(ib., R. V.,1II 581, Ch. Voi:i., 12).
These e5<plana t i on s are hardly acceptable. Firstly, the
attitude of the Christian toward the World is only here described
as "knowledge of the World"; it is n.sually "mastery over all possi-
ible hindrances in the "orld" (so meant in Ch. Voll., 12). Second-
ly, the normal object of religious knov/ledge is ,od, although a
relation to the V/orld is included. "hirdly, the assertion is
inconsistent with Ritschl’s original position in lA. There, both
kinds of knowledge aimed at mastery over the World, but the object
of science was the observable facts of experience, where the
dualism of Nature and Spirit is fundamental; whereas toe object of
religion was a totality
,
" Uie unified pur^^ose and goal of things
in God*'{R. V., Ill lA.
,
178f.). That is, the difference as regards
that object was emphasized (cf. Fab., Ill), Fourthly, as v/e shall
snow below, the actual reason for the collision does not lie in
the object, but in the attempt by the subject to combine the two
irreconcilable types of knowledge in the discipline of theology,
Wiiich shall be both science and religious kn:)wledge. Ritschl’s
reference to the object as the ground of collision is in so far
true as theology does make inferences in regard to the World which
religious knowledge as such does not make.
That Ritschl realized this proble?7i is clear. "If", he says,
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finy proof cf^n be brought for the scientific validity of the idea
of God which is not merely a reflection of the religious consci-
ousness on its own inner connection", it would have to be the proof
which we discussed above (III die) and v/iiich involves the
acceptance of the religious idea of God as the explanation of the
World, but which religion does not need for itself. Here, the
object of science is the V/orld; of religious knowledge" the inner
connection of the religious consciousness". Eut Christianity is
equally valid, whether we think a relation between the World and
God or not. Heedless to say, this contradicts Ritschl’s view of
God as creator.
Results.
The connection of Ritschl’s system contradicts his assertion
that religious knowledge has the same object as scientific know-
ledge, namely, the "/orld. The object of the former is either God
or simply "the inner connection of the religious consciousness".
The criterion of truth is twofold; reason, for knowledge of the
’Vorld, and the demand of the religious consciousness, for religious
knowledge. ^he two are thought of as absolutely independent; the
attempt to reconcile them cancels itself.
—
2 Theology, as partaking of the Nature of eacii Kind of
Knowing.
Religious knowledge, we have seen, must be clear, must con-
sist of ethical confidence in God and the appropriate degree of
feeling; and involves the mastery of the World, together with the
confidence that the World is ruled for a purpose by God. Scien-
tific knowledge is disinterested, theoretical, superior to
ethical and emotional motives; its object is the World in space
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In spite of the thorouj^h-going dualism of subject-matter,
metnod and spirit between the two types of knowledge, Ritschl
sees in theology a discipline wnicii unites the two, by expressing
religious knowledge in the forms of scientific knowledge.
(X Elements in common with other Sciences.
That Ritschl viewed theology as science is beyond all question
(R. V.,I 616, II 1, 4, III 217 etc.). It is precisely science
in the sense in wnich science is different from religious knowledge.
It is *'not devotion, but as science is disinterested knowledge"
(R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
203). It has the following traits in common
with all sciences. First, it is its aim to discover laws in the
material which constitutes its subject-matter; it is bound to
hold to the method of law (R. V.,II 1). Second, it is a self-
consistent system. The fact that theology is a science is to be
grounded in the proof that the idea of personality can be applied
to God without contradiction (R. 223, 217ff.,); and that
other concepts, like atonement, can be thought without contradictio n
(R. V.,III 309). This systematic aspect distinguishes dogmatics
from Biblical Theology (R. V.,I 2A.
,
615). The latter secures,
it is true, the correctness of Christian ideas in tneir original
meaning (R. V.,II1 15); but this is not the correctness of
theological form, whicii can be attained only from the point of
view of the systematic connection of theology,- and (adds 3A. )
,
precisely because every theological definition can be formulated
only in the connection of the whole, we have the guarantee that
the tlieological propositions that are rightly defined will not
stand in contradiction to each other (R. V.,III 3A.
,
15).
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in themselves Christian. RitscVil points out that ’.7hen theology
is formulated wholly in such extra-Christian concepts (natural
theology), Christianity is really in danger (ill c 3), but insists
nevertheless that theology needs terms which, so far as their







Theology is a science because it aims to discover lav/s in a
specific realm of reality and because it is a self-consi stent
system. The significance of the laws v/ill manifestly depend on
tlie nature of the reality of wiiich they are -'n expression. Since
the systematic form refers oniy to consistency witnin the system





24), that form cannot be viewed as a criterion of the truth
of the system, but only as a regulative principle. The criterion
must, then, be sought in the subject-matter itself.—
l3
Its sxjecial Subject-matter.
As science, theology is entitled to its special field, its
definite subject-matter. That subject-matter is not, as
Schleiermacher taught, the current doctrine of the Church (R. V. , II
1-4) nor, as Thornasius and others held, the religious experience
of the theologian himself (R. V.,I 642ff.).
It is rather (in all A A.) the faith of the Community that
it stands in the relation to God which is essentially conditioned
by forgiveness of sins that is the immediate object of theological
knowledge (R. V.,III 3). And so, the aim of tiieology is validly
to characterize universal Christianity (R. V.,II 8). Christianity,
then, is primary, is given as true; theology is secondary.
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"Theol ogi cnl tiieory }ias vr,lue only in bO fnr as it corresi^onds
to faith" (G. a..
I
133, in 1869), and vice ver sa > "Nothing should
be incorporated into dogmatics which Cconnot be used in the pulpit
and in Christian life" (R. 3A. . 573). Raitji, Christian
life, is plainly what Ritschl has called "religious knowledge";
this is the subject-matter of theology.
Results.
The subject-matter (and constitutive criterion) of theology
is the faith of tiie Community in God (cf. above IV b 2 ).—
Theology not scientific.
We liave found Ritsciil (in all A A.) asserting the scientific
character of theology as disinterested knowledge. But (esp. in
2=3A. ) we find him asserting precisely the contrary. Objective,
disinterested knowledge has its place in natural science; but
the objective account of religion is neither exhaustive nor
sati sfactory, — indeed, the more objectively the truths of Chris-
tianity are narrated, the nearer 'we are to scepticism (R. V.,III
2=3A.
,
34). Objectivity, in the sense of an "even momentary
indifference to the Christian religion . . serves to undermine
Christian faith" (R. V.,III 3A., 187). Christianity survived
Ocholasticism and orthodox Protestant theology only in so far as
it left the scientific conditions of the doctrine of God inoperative
(R. V. , III 216), It is precisely this scientific character that
made the theology of the Greek Churcri a failure (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
184) and constituted "the secularization of Christianity" (Fid.
irapl., 75). If, then, tlieology is scientific, it is not Christian.
Further, Ritschl’s theology does not correspond to his
definition of science. The latter is disinterested. The former is
l?-» ,/rJ«l ,SiI I,.* c.'
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in service of the CoriLTiunity, nnd presupijoses an interest more
than mere attention; yes, an intei'est t/mt requires the theologian
to belong to the Community, and that makes ’'the freedom from
presuppositions" in our study of the history of Jesus (for instance}





in conti-adic tion to ] = 2A., specifically denies the character
of scientific knowledge to the acceptance of the idea of God,
on which theology rests (R, 3A.
,
211-hl5}. The (late)
recognition of "mysteries" in tneology would furtiier tend to
distinguish it from science (cf. above II c 3 ii).
Resul ts
.
In opposing the traditional separation of natural theology
and revelation, Ritsclil says that the truth cannot be put together
out of tv./o essentially different halves (T. M.
,
32). Y/e may apply
tae same principle to iiis own attempt to coirbine scientific and
religious knowledge in theology. Religious knov/ledge is the
normative element in theology. The scientific form is non-essential,
incomplete and even harmful.—
c Value judging.
'7e have found theology, as Ritsciil conceives it, to be
essentially different fromi any other science; for in it alone of
all sciences, the form is sometliing relatively non-essential;
tne relation between form and content is, as it were, accidental
and external; the content alone contains the criterion of its truth.
The content Ritschl expresses quite sim.ply in the one word confi-
dence -confidence tiiat is, in the God revealed in Christ. He also
describes this confidence by another term. "All truths of religious
character are direct value judgments" (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
376).
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In view of the well-known pVienortenon that the value- Judgment
theory' is popularly considered to be trie characteristic element
of Ritschl’s system, it is interesting to note triat the use of
the phrase is not original with Ritsciil; on the authority and at
tlie request of Prof. V/. Herrmann of Ilarburg, it may be pointed out
that both Fabricius, who (111 note 1) attributes the introduction
of the phrase to J. Kaftan, and 0. Ritschl ( "Wer turtei le" ) , who
asserts that W. Herrmann was trie first to use it, are wrong.
Ritschl, Kaftan and Herrmann derived the term from a common source
in the philosophy of Lotze.
1 Criteria of Value.
The word "value'* is one of the most elusive and least sus-
ceptible to definition in the entire philosophical vocabulary. V/e
must, then, be careful to ascertain Ritschl' s criterion or criteria
of value.
o< Practical Results.
In one of his discussions of fundamental principles, he
identifies value- judging wit}i tlie act of establishing the efficien-




376f.). This thought, that the meaning and value of
truth is to be found only in practical results, is one that occurs
frequently in Ritschl' s writings (R. V.,I]I 2=3A.
,
23, II 160, etc.
)
It is implied in his teaching that trie deity of Christ can be
understood only in terms of the actual experience of the Community
(II c) and is related to nis positivistic "ontology" in that each
emphasizes immediate experience. The notion that "complete"
knowledge is the most valuable, which leads (as we liave shown) to
the conclusion that thinking is entirely superfluous, is likewise
an empiiasis on concrete results, on the present- in- experience
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(T. M. , 32).
Result
.
Ritschl evidently views concrete practical results as a




At the conclusion of his theological methodology, Ritschl
shov/o that the starting-point for all scientific proof in theology
must he, as Spener had already shovrn, the ethical standpoint of






Eor theology, the Ethos
has an unconditionally higher value than the Kosmos (cf. Schl.,
42f., and above III c). The fundamental concepts must be ethical,
not physical ( G. P., Ill 143). The moral- religious new birtii
must be the condition of the religious knov/ledge of God and His
revelation in Christ ( G. P.,II 410). In the article on Ecclesi-
astical Law (1869), he had pointed out that "only persons and
personal influences of a.n ethical nature are able to preserve and
perpetuate the Community" (G. A. , I 144). In criticising the
tlieology of A. H. Francke, he expresses regret that that thinker
was prevented by his Scholasticism from recognizing his conscious-
ness of ethical power as the criterion of his justification (R. Y.
,
I 361f.). This ethical criterion of religious truth was clearly
asserted in all periods of his life.
Fabricius holds, indeed, that in lA. the ethical ideal of
the Kingdom was the criterion of truth, and that lA. in general
represented an ethical rationalism, which was in later A A.
qualified by metaphysical ideas and l:>y the authority of revelation
(Fab., 134). Fabricius has doubtless proved, in specific passages,
the fact of this change of empiiasis. But over against his results,
stands the fact that the ethical criterion was, as we have shown,
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cileMrly .-i sc-.ei’ted ir pil oeriodB of ritschl's ?:ork, includirg t}ie
present nspect of the value- J udgment tiieory of 2=.'5A. ; and, on the
other nand, the fact tnat the essay "On the Conscience" (G. A., II
177-203), der.ies that t/ie c.-nacience (and so et/.ics) is an authori-
tative (riterion and affirms the need of the revelation in Christ
as the objective support of our conscience (cf. Unterr., 52). V/e
conclude that both ethics and revelation were alv'ays (conflicting)
elements in Ritschl’s critei-ion of truth.
Ritschl’s earlier thought, as Fabricius has shovvn, tended
tovhards a "duty ethics" (formalistic); his later thouglit towards
a "goods ethics" ( eudaemonistic
,
cf. Fab., 28f, 41). The tendency
V'ould seem to be away from tne subject toward the object. Rut
his positivistic theory of knowledge irriplies a tendency precisely
tlie opposite. The increased emphasis on the "religious" concepts
as opposed to the "ethical" is again a tendency away from the
subject. '"hese cross currents seem to indicate that Ritschl’s
thought in regard to the problem in question was never in equi-
librium; and that his miethod was empirical.
Results.
The ethical will to practise a truth in life is always for
Ritschl a fundamental criterion of value. Rut this subjective -
individualistic view finds a rival in the empliasis on the objective
revelation (history, Christ, Community) and tends itself to become
miore objective (goods etliics). -
2 The Subject of Value- judging.
It would seem as if practical results and etixics were criteria
v/nich any ituman being is constitutionally equipped to apply to any
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the criteriri, the nature of the object and the inaight of the
person judging? Is the human individual as such competent to judge,
or is his value- judging dependent for its validity on special
conditions? Is iie actually the subject of value- j udging?
o( The Individual.
On the one hand, he makes statements v.-hicii seem to assert
tha t man virtue of his innate constitution is competent to judge
of values. P.itschl’s program of principles asserts that he intends
to prove that '’the Christian ideal of life and no other absolutely
satisfies the claims of the human spirit "R^ith reference to the
knowledge of things” (R. V.,III 2=3A.
,
25). Value is to be measured
by its significance for self-consciousness,- by the effect of a





cf. II 352, III 586). The spirit’s self-evaluation is the
fundamental fact (R. V.,III 213, cf. 201).
Results.
Ritschl asserts in the passages of which our quotations are
typical that the human spirit makes "claims” which are "satisfied”
in Christianity;- that is, the human spirit as such, every in-
dividual in his deepest nature. Any human being is a competent
subject of value- judging.
—
^
The Member of the Community.
Rut there is another group of passages, which is much larger
and more characteristic than the individualistic utterances, and
in the light of which the latter must be interpreted. If we recall
all that we have proven regarding the Community as source and
criterion of truth, and regarding the fact that all tlieology is
in the service of the Community, tiien we shall be prepared for the
MS
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r
statement that, ‘'If one can kno'v God truly only in Christ, then
one can know Him only by joining the Community of believers"
(K. V.,I.I1 2=3A.
,
8). The ethical proof (cf. above IV c 1) can
only succeed when undertaken from the standpoint of tlie Community
of believers" (R. V.,!!! 2=3A.
,
8). The gospel exists for un-
believers merely as an act of men; it is real, as act of God, only




The differences, for instance, betw'een a Huddhist and a
Christian are so great that the religious points of view of a
Christian are scarcely accessible to a Buddhist (T. M.
,
39). The
superiority of Christianity and the corresponding evaluation of
other religions is sometliing wliich only a member of the Christian
Communi ty could be expected to accept; it is merely a means of
"mutual understanding among Christians". As scientific proof it
would not convince Buddhist or l^ohammedan (R. V.,II1 3A.
,
188).
The need for forgiveness of sin is purely Christian (R. V.,I 60),
and Ritschl’s proof of its reasonableness presupposes the accept-
ance of the whole Christian World- vi ev; (R. V.,!!! 498f
. ) . Scripture
has its value "for us Christians" (Fid. impl., 71, 74).
Results.
Only members of the Christian Community can be subjects of
value-judging in the Christian sense. That is, one must first
accept the entire V/orld-view of Christianity, including its esti-
mate of man (need for forgiveness) before one’s value judgments
can avail to show the truth of Christianity. This is clearly the
a rgumen tu rn in circ ujl_Q . —
3 Kinds of Value Judgments.
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value judgnenta, ” acconipnry i ng" and "independent".
The former are present and essential in all tlieoretical
knowledge and observation in the form of "interest", attention to
the subject-matter. Of tiie latter class - the independent value
judgraents — F.itschl gives tv^o illustrations. The first is "all
knowledge of ethical purposes, in so far as it arouses satisfaction
or dissatisfaction". The second class is "religious knowledge."
It cannot be reduced to the ethical type. "It consists of in-
dependent value judgments, which refer to man’s relation to the
V/orld, and produce feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction,
in which man either enjoys his mastery of the World through God’s
help; or is painfully conscious of the lack of that help" (R. V.,
Ill ?.= 3A., 195).
It is the second class which demands our attention. The
term "independent value judgments" is an enigmatical one. It
raises of itself the question, independent of what? The mere
terminology would lead one to say, independent of reference to any
object apart from the idea of value. Fut the phrase "independent
of objective reference" would manifestly not correspond to Ritschl’s
meaning; firstly, because he states that the distinction is one





because the definition of value- judging presupposes reference to
tvro objective realities besides man, namely God (and His help)
and the V/orld (and man’s relation to it). Value- judging, in the
Ritschlian sense, does not mean to prove religious truths by a
subjective method, but simply presupposes the objective realities.
V/hat, then, is the distinction between independent and
accompanying value judgraents? The latter, we find, are present in,
or accompany, theoretical knov'ing and technical observation and
•*_
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combination. Tiie independent judgments v/ould then mean those
independent of such t/ieoretical knowing and technical observation.
In them, -ve express the relation between our vhll (and feeling)
and the presupposed or known object. If the independence of
value Judgments is to mean their independence of theoretical
knowing, nevertheless their very nature as value judgments implies
their dependence on sorae kind of knowing, of positing of an object,
that is not merely practical evaluation. These Judgments are not
in the form, if Christianity is true, then it has value; but it
has value and is therefore true. The form is rather, Christianity
is given as true, and has value, is practical.
The problem arises, what kind of knowledge is that which is
not theoretical, nor yet value- Judging, but a presupposition of
the latter?
The answer that this knowledge may be called hypothetical is
excluded by our interpretation above and by Kitschl's specific
rejection of the idea after lA. (ITI d It), that is to say, ever
since his formulation of the value- Judgment theory. There is only
one alternative. We must view this type of knowledge as a bare
assertion, a mere taking for granted, a renunciation of all proof.
Results.
Ritschl’s definition of value- Judging does not permit us to
view it as the assertion of the objective existence of a reality
on account of its worth for our subjective life. lleitiier can we
view it as a criterion of truth; for it presupposes knowledge
about the objects in question. It does not even serve the function
of hypothesis.—
4 The Relations of the two Elements in Value-Judging.
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'7e nave alreaay pointed out that va lue- judging in Hitschl’s
opinion involves the relations of two elemen ts —v/i 11 ing and
feeling— to tiie presuf^P'Osed knowledge of God, World and roan. \7e
ask now, what is the relative stress on each of these tv/o elements?
Fi. 27, on "The nature and chief Characteristics of
Religion" is a comparison and evaluation of the different religions.
In lA.(cf. Fah., 107), the treatment v'as philosophical and ethical.
The revision of 2=5A. canceled this standpoint and substitutes
for it tiie criterion of tlie "given" Community? tradition. Tlie new
criterion is, indeed, not feeling, but resembles it in so far
as it is not product of thought or ethical activity and is some-
thing that we "suffer" not "do".
Let us take another example. In R. V.,III 321, Kitschl
defines sin as "tiie oxiposite of the ethical Kingdom of God", and
it is the consistent view of lA. that sin is essentially on offence
against the etiiical. But 2A. and still more empiiatically 3A.
regard it as essentially a religious offence (Fab. 44); that is,
tiie element of feeling plays a larger part.
Or let us examine Eitschl’s definition of Christianity. In
lA. it ran: "Christianity is the completely .spiritual and etiiical
monotiieistic religion, v/hich, on the basis of the life of its
founder, v/ho established the Kingdom of God, exists in tiie freedom
of tiie relation of Sons/.ip to God and includes the impulse to
conduct from the motive of love; its aim in the ethical organ-
ization of humanity" (R. lA.
, 9, Fab., 29). It is, then,
predominantiy ethical. 2=3A. added to the above, "and grounds
blessedness in the relation of Sonship to God as well as in the
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ness is cnarac teri s ti c of 2=3A. as against the more purely ethical







457, the eudaemoni Stic idea of the kingdom is
judged unfavorably; 2=3A.
,
490 holds precisely the opposite
opinion. It is not necessary to multiply examples. It is clear
that Ritschl first viewed the Kingdom as predominantly ethical;
but that a different standard of value led him to view it later
as the fact within which the feeling of "blessedness" is experi-
enced .
There is no question that there is a striking change away
from the primacy of the will toward the primacy of feeling.
Blessedness is "the feeling of joy in eternal life", which is
permanently bestowed in the present along th forgiveness of
sins (R. 2=3A.
,
95). How important he held this point of
view to be is evident from the fact that he insisted on it in
spite of its not being made plain by the reformers. As we have
shown above, tne tendency was for Ritschl to draw nearer to the
symbolical writings of the Lutheran Churcli. Here, however, is a
change in the otner direction, a criange so significant that Ritschl
could describe the blessedness which it served to emphasize as
"the higliest value concept, which determines everything else"





willing was the supreme value, in the form of ethical
participation in the work of tiie KingdoMi; in 2=3A.
,
feeling is
the higliest value, in the form of "blessedness",—
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'Ve are now ready to interpret the results of our investigation.
Our method has ocen strictly inductive; we have rjresented in
detail all aspects of Ritschl's tiiought in connection wit?i which,
either implicitly or explicitly, we find any matei-ial fruitful for
our theme. Our separate investigations have led us to many
different, even contradictory, f ormiula tions of Ritscnl’s criterion
of truth. v^uite intentionally, we have renounced every effort to
systematize and relate tiiese results, but have left them fluid, in
order to attain the utmost objectivity of treatment.
As we apjjroach toe task of the genei’n li za ti on of our results,
it will be with certain presuppositions. Our results, although
manifold, are nevertheless tne thoughts of one man, an intellectual
leader; we presuppose, tiien, that we shall probably find a measure
of unity in our apparently confused material. On the other hand,
scarcely any productive mind ever attained perfect unity and har-
mony, even in fundamentals, and every living mind is subject to
the law of development; we presuppose, then, tliat we shall probably
not find any one criterion of truth which Ritschl applied vrith
equal consequence in all parts of nis system or at all stages of
his career.
'ie take as our starting-point Ritschl's discussion of the
nature of theology as a science (IV b 2^
• (3 • j/ ) where, if anywhere
we should expect to find enlightenment as to fundamental principles
There we find that theology i.s a consistent system (o^), the
subject-matter of which is the faith of the Christian CoiTjnunity
( ^) , and the aim of which is the service of that Commuiuty [y }
.
Not tne scientific form, which is neitlier complete nor normative
;jl ) , but tiie religious knowledge or faith or confidence of the
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Community is the supreme content and criterion of trutxi.
'’•ith tiiis vcriterion in mind, let us review our results as a
whole. We have found that Ritschl rejected the traditional
subjectivistic experience of repentance by appealing to the needs,
ideals and history of tne Christian Community that stands under the
influence of the Lutheran Reformation (I a lo<.)
,
the Community and
not the experience of conversion is authoritative (^); tjie history
and faith of the Community are normative as against the religious
experience of any individual (y). Individualistic feelings and
Catholic piiety must be rejected in favor of the clearly understood
view of tne Lutheran Community (I a 2^). These viev/s are
characteristic of G. P.
Ritschl’ s account of the testimonium is less unambiguous,
but at any rate, in spite of an emphasis on the activity of the
self, the knowledge of God in tne Community is so significant that
it is described as equivalent to the Holy Spirit or God’s knowledge
of Himself (a 2.(3). The same ambiguity obtains in the discussion
of mysticism; but the history and ideals of the Lutheran Community
are obviously normative as opposed to individual mystical experience
{y) > Our relation to God (or Christ) must be mediated through
tlie tradition of the historical Community (I b 2 CX i
,
iii).
So real is the content of this tradition to him that he does
not feel any of the theoretical difficulties arising from the
fact that a historical Community is the source of religion (II a 2).
This uncritical attitude toward history leads him to apply the
term "revelation" to any coinplex of ideas that is held as true
by any religious Community (II b 1 °<. ) . The Christian revelation,
the final and complete one, is the content of the self-conscious-
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in the tradition (^also II c 3 |5 ) . The Cnristian revelation is
tne exclusive iind perfect criterion of trutn for the Community
;,11 e 2 cx
,
(3 ) , uncoridi tionally superior to conscience (except in
tile case of Jesus, where conscience and revelation coincided) (y )l
and not to he proved (or disproved) by the 'use of reason in
theology or in any other field (6 i, ii). We become acquainted
with the revelation through the records of the early Community
(II b 3c\ ) in the IJ. T. The inspiration of the 'T. T. means that
it was written by members of the early Community who understood
t/ie 0. T.(II b 3 (3 i ) ; it contains the essential trutji of Christ-
ianity ( ii;t), although it also contains errors and is authoritative
only in so far as it is appropriated by the later Christian Com-
munity ( ii^).
The essential criterion in the history is not the N. T., but
Christ, who is at once the content of Scripture and the head of
t/ie Community. The revelation in him is complete and unsurpa ssable
perfection, and is given, au tiiori ta ti ve source for all theology
(y i, ii), although the emphasis is more on the fact that Christ
founded the Community and incorporated the ideal of sinlessness,
than on His person (II c 1); indeed, the actual, historical Jesus
of Nazaretri receives very little attention at Ritsclil*s hands-
neither His death nor His miracles are particularly significant
(2). Hot the personal Christ, but the Christ-ideal in the Com-
munity is tuen the ultimate criterion (3). The divinity of Christ
is really only an expression for the fact that the Community has





regarding it simply as an expression of the fact that
tile influence of Christ is still active in the Community; later.
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ne tended to accept the actual present existence of Christ with
C-od as a mystery (ii); the first view dissolved the exa Itati o
into experiences of the Community, the second accepted the Com-
munity doctrine as normative. So, too, at first he rejected the
preexistence as meaning nothing in the present experience of the
Community; later he approached the traditional view (iii).
Ritscnl begins R. V. with tiie assertion tnat the founding of
the Comrr.unity by Christ coincides v/itli the justification and
atonement of sinners and that the center of theology is to be
found in these facts (II d). The actual history of the Community
has been marred by sin; nevertheless, the unity of the historical
Community is, in some sense, necessary to Christianity, and no
matter how sinful it may have been, true religious experience is
always possible within its borders (II d 1). This Community is
sometimes (in all A A.) thought as the realistic unity, which is
the object of Christ’s work and the mediator of the same to the in-
dividual (II d 2 tk i ) ; when he looks on it as a nomina] i stic-socia
1
unity, the emphasis is rather on the ethical nature of the in-
dividual; and the Community has less the nature of authority (ii).
The dogmatic - religious conception of tne P’ingdorn, which Ritschl
tended to accept later in life, means that divine causality in the
Community is emphasized (II d 3(3 i). The Word and Sacraments are
tiie works of the Churcii (in the dogmatic sense) and are the cri-
teria of the presence of God; the ethical act of prayer is
essentially a confessing of God and Christ {y i, ii); the visible
Church is necessary to our salvation ( ib,) . Toward the legal
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other, sno regnrds legal forms rs belonging to the Woric rather
tlian to the Church. ?ut later he declared that legal ordinances
are just as essential as worship itself; and he makes it a
principle to submit to the doctrinal standards of Lutheranism
(II d iii).
As we turn to his discussion of metaphysics, we note a re-
lation between his positivistic ontology and his attitude toward
the Community. A.ll that Ritschl has said regarding Christian faith
from the Community standpoint (with the exception of the later
concessions to exalta ti o
,
preexistence, etc.) means to move in the
realm of "positive" knowledge, that is, of immiediate experience.
Rut precisely because he views the ontology as establishing the
conditions of all knov/ledge, including that of Christianity, the
ultimate formal criterion lies in the reason, not in Christianity
(cf. Ill b 2). But cosmology is rejected, not from rational
considerations, but because it cannot arrive at the Christian idea
of God as revealed to the Community (III c 3). The positive
Christian World-view is not built up on the basis of rational
induction, but from the point of view of the revealed idea of God
in the Christian Community (III d 1). That Fe is love, personality*,
will; that Kis knowledge is ever present, we know only out of tne
Cnristia.n revelation and from no other source (III d 1
,
|S
If science is to explain the coexistence of h'ature and Spirit, its
only recourse is to accept tne God of Christianity - so lA. 3A.
went to the fanatical extreme of asserting that Christianity v/ould
be religiously and practically true, even if the idea of God were
not used to explain the World - that is, even if there is no re-
lation thought betvieen God and World! (Ill dll). The Christian
idea of God leads him to an immanence theory, and this positivistic
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ontulogy to o aeistic position. And yet he never thought through
tiie implications of immanence. The World is for /lim chiefly a
Eometning to be overcome (III d 2 ).
We turn now to Ritschl’s logical principles. The content
(the faith of tne Community) must be clearly and fully defined
and studied witii sympathy ( IV a 1, 2). Logical form does not
estahlisn the trutn of religion (IV b 1 ) ; true religious know-
ledge takes the form of confidence directed toward the God given
to the Community through revelation (IV b 1 (3 ) ; the revelation is
an absolute criterion that cannot be proven either by reason or
by ethics, but is given to both (ib.).
The famous value- Judgment theory is by no means clear and
unified. It is at present important to note that only members of
tile :''ommunity are competent to be subjects of value- J udging
;
such
Judging is, tnen, not a proof of the truth of Christianity, but
is rather a practising of Christianity on tne basis of its assumed
trutn (IV c 2^). The fundamental definition of "independent"
value judgments presupposes the Christian World-view as the given
object of confidence (IV c 3).
'Ve may summarize by saying that the faith of the Community
in the Cod revealed in Christ is the fundamental criterion of
truth vdth Litschl. "hat agrees with it is true.
This criterion must be formulated with the utmost care. It
1
would, for instance, for inaccurate to say that Scripture is
Ritschl’s ultimate norm of truth; he excludes much that is there
(miracles, eschatology, errors in Paul) and includes much that is
not there (Community); and finally, expressly rejects Biblical
theology as an adequate account of Chr i stianity . It would also
be inaccurate to say that the revelation in Christ is the final
'i
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• fv for liini, unless ve define reveletion as includin^^
au tnor 1 ^-y
^
•
-t-z-T-icai existence and development of ITis Community,
the 5 1 vj * '‘•
However, when we say that the faith of the Christian Com-
-c for Ritschl the source of ultimate and final truth, we
munity was l i -
+ ^/pt T-cached a completely adequate formulation. Thehave n o L ^ ^
nf believers precisely in sc far as it lias retainedCommunity oi a
f ’ th in i"^^
ford., in spite of pettiness and sin, is the authority
for u'--'- that is, the
ideal tendenc 3'' of the Community, In the
last cjecade of Ritscnl’s life, he was inclined to identify tiiis
idea'' tendency''
with the actual formulations of the Lutlieran
doctrinal standards (Lutheran as opposed to Catholic, sym'bolical
V.ooks, extra JHLLa
But v/s have not yet found a unification of all the material
• OUT analysis had discovered. Tiie criterion v-^hich we have
established may ’oe described as intellectual and social ; intel-
lectual because the faith of the Community is expressed in an
idea '^bout God, a traditional World-view, an accurate recollection
of the hi Christ; and social, because these ideas exist
onlA' in the Christian Community and have truth and power only for
individuals identified with that Community. There are,
hawe'^'er a<asspg<^s yet to be considered in which the criterion is
neither intellectual nor social; in which not ideas
essentiaiJ-y
but e''periences or deeds are ultimate norms; and in w'nicli the
individual such (not as member of the Community) is the subject.
Returnirg to t'ne results of our investigation of experience,
we find certain elements t'na t did not fit into our discussion of
tile Coniirunity faith as criterion. Ritschl’ s chief reason for
+ -:x-r the testimonium sr-iritus sancti and Yvsticism was his
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belief ti^at they denied the activity of the self; ae assumed
tiiat only that is true and real v/hich represents the Sjubject as
"doin^" (I a 2^ ' (cf.^ ). Tnis is an ethical criterion; the
.active self and not the Community or its fcaith is the subject.
The rejection of !i!ysticism was also based partly on the fact that
it lacks et;.ical sanity, denies the will its full right (I y , ?)•
There is absolutely' no true religious experience in which the
self is not ethically active (I b lex).
In so far as ’ itschl interprets the Coinmunity as a '’nomi-
nalistic-social" unity, his ultimate criterion is the ethical nature
of the individuals making up the Conununity, and not the Community
itself as given (II a 2cxii). The great thought of the Kingdom,
the final goal of God, the World and the Community, is an ethical
ideal of universal love (II d ."^^ii). We must note tne qualifi-
cation tiiat the ethics presupposes the dogmatics, although neither
can be reduced to the other (II d 3 ^ and cT '> • That is, the ethical
activity of love cannot be reduced to the religious activity in
the Community of believers. In some sense, ethics is a separate
field, with a peculiar criterion. r.n the other hand, the so-
called etiiical activity of prayer is purely a confession of the
faith of the Community (j/ii).
Ritschl's psychology belongs under this same category. for
him, conscious activity was the only psychological reality - tlnis
is ethical, even if it does deny the soul- in- itself 'III b 4).
In his attitude toward the World as something to be overcome,
and toward Christianity as furnishing the means to the mastery of
the 'torld, the argument seems, in part, to proceed from a univei-sal
-
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•^Ithoucrh triis view prevailed ir 1'., the tendency of d . was to
emphacize the ahsolute supremacy of Ciirislian revelation, over
ap^ainst the clairrs of a lation-il eteics, and to interpret the
mastery in ter;cs of feeling ( 3 (3 ) . lievertlieless, all editions
I
ret-iiin the etnical argui.ient tiiat man's sense of liis own spiritual
dignity is the final answer to all rrecha ni ca 1 '//orld-v lews (3<x ).
Trie "religious knowledge" of 2=3A*, i.owever, presupposes that the
ethical confidence he directed to'ward the God of revelation; here
the et.rical attitude is simply the means of appropriating the
revelation (IV b 1 j3 ) . But some expressions of the theory of
value-judging do not seem to imply the necessary reference to the
revelation, but look on the "consciousness of ethical power" as
an immediate and sufficient guarantee of truth; the ethical stand-
point of John 7, 17 is the starting point for all scientific proof
in tiieology; but tliis criterion does not reacii a pure expression
or a systematic development. It is apparently too subjective
completely to satisfy Ritsclil (IV c 1
,
of. 2^^ and ).
This ethical criterion, which our second sifting of the
material has revealed, may be expressed as follows; any religious
idea is true provided it satisfies the ethical nature of man; or
provided it furnished adequate motives for the activity of the
self. Sometimes tiii s criterion is expressed as love; sometimes as
self-ac tivi ty . It is essentially teleological. Something to be
done, some aim or activity, some ideal goal triat calls forth man’s
ethical best is the ultimate test of wlietiier an idea is true or not
But there is still a large body of the results of our in-
vestigation that cannot be classified as belonging to either of
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as to exatnine these passages and to ascertain whetner they contain
any common logical principle.
If we turn to Ritschl’s account of the subjective aspect of
religious experience, we shall find the first of t’uose passages.
There a new criterion is formulated, which is different from either
of the other two that we have discussed: namely, irmnediacy
,
verifiability in present experience. Only the practical, concrete
and usable shall be viewed as true (I b 1^). The power of the
line of argument or type of piety expressed in this criterion is
clear from the fact that in spite of Ritschl’s repeated rejection
of all Mysticism, and all notions of an immediate relation to God
or Cnrist, he nevertneless asserts an experience, immedi.ate and
concrete, independent even of the Community; a personal sanctuary
in which we realize the presence of God (I b 2 )
.
tiCuen we examine Ritschl’s utterances regarding metaphysics,
we find the same principle playing an important part. His evaluation
of that discipline implies that the worthfully true is to be
found not in abstractions, but in the concrete, particular and
specific (III a 1). Particularly the concrete distinctions be-
tween Nature and Spirit uiust be retained (2). The Ritschlian
ontology is formulated from this same point of view. Phenomena,
as they are given in experience, and only so, are real. The
criterion of truth is immediacy in experience. Anything is to be
viewed as true if, and only if, it is concretely and immediately
"given*’ in experience (ill b 1, 2, 3, 4). Things- in- themselves
are not "given" and so are not real.
Here belong also nost of tiie utterances regarding "mastery
It is predominantly conceived as a religiousof t.ie -ohrld".
»r ti.t - ^
/•y
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e.Tiotion, the feeling of freeiorn from tlie V/orld (l u 2 CX i i ) which
accompanies the consciousness that vre are Sons of God. It cannot
be attained by any effort of will, but is a datum of consciousness-
blessedness - which, in later years, Ritschl rates sx^ec i f i ca 1 ly
higher tlian t'ue ethical criterion of love (III d Z p) . Tiiis, in
co/mnon with the positivistic ontology, emrjhasizes the “gi''‘^6n*' in
consciousness, the immediately experienced, as oxrposed to the
objective criaracter of the Community and the active character of
ethics. This feelinxi of blessedness is cliarac ter i •7.ed in 2=3A.
,
as the jiighest value concept which determines evertiiing else (IV
c 4 ) .
Along with many passages (in all A A.,
)
limiting tne place of
feeling in religion, we have found that it is (esjiecialiy in 2=3A. )
an essential |)art of all religious knowledge and in some sense a
criterion of religious truth; for what satisfies the “heart*' - the
longings, the "given" demands of human nature - is true (IV b <5’,
cf . c 2 ) .
One aspect of the theory of values belongs under tiie present
criterion. In so far as “practical results" are a test of value
(and so of truth), the concrete, the actual- in- experience, that
is, the "given" is the criterion ( IV c 1 (X )
.
We have ro'w found three different criteria of truth implicit
in Ritsciil’s fundamental thinking. First, tlie ideal tendency of
t’ne Comiaunity of believers in Christ (as foriaulated in Lutheran
doctrinal standards); second, the ethically good; and third, that
which is concretely "given" in exxDerienoe. "/e sliall refer to these
hereafter ^-s 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
The 'iucstion naturally arises as to whether, after all, these
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(Victory. V/e s/iall undertake to bear in mind the presuppositions
of our investii^ati on and seek for unity, without trying to force
really different principles into an unnatural agreement.
'T'he fairest test as to the relation of these criteria to each
other would V^e to cal], to mind some of Ritsciil’s own utterances
that bear on tne subject. Thus it becomes clear that in so far as
Ritschl held fast to 1, he qualified or denied 2 and 3. “The
Essay on the Conscience", for instance, is a flat rejection of 2
in favor of 1. In so far as lie thought clearly the Christian idea
of God in 1, he was led to direct contradiction of 3; e.g.- the
assertion that tne living God is to be distinguished from His
purposes and His creatures (ill d iS)- an admission of God- in-
Himself! Again, his concessions to the preexistence and exaltatio
,
were contradictory to the objections that he himself had formerly
raised from the standpoint of 3. Again, the "personal sanctuary"
of 3, ne accompanied with expressions of indifference toward 1.
1 leads to an immanence theory, and 3 to tne distinction between
nature and Spirit and so to Deism (III d 1
€). And one of the
more characteristic features of Ritscnl's thouglit is his conscious
and continued distinction between 2 and 3, - between the ethical
Kingdom and the "given" emotional experience of tne mastery of
the \7orld (III d 3(3). It is further clear tnat 3, with its
"given" facts of experience, violates the demand of 2 for the
subordination of the Kosmos under the Htlios .
It is clear that the three criteria do not coincide; that
they, in part at least, contradict each otiier; and that Ritschl was
aware of tne incongruity. This last fact is one which may afford
us, to a degree, an explanation of the inconsistencies. V/e have
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found thnt clearness and accuracy rneant a great deal to Piitschl
put it was the clearness and accuracy of a man who demanded re-
ligious life and rated it higher than tiieological form; fno cjuld
look jn the consistency of a theological system as something purely
formal and regulative; in sliort of a man who was fund-omen tally an
empiricist - -js is already clear from nis positivistic ontology,
such a man might be expected to construct a theology that is in-
tended to be confined to the realm of history (although the
Christian idea of a personal and transcendent God makes the under-
taking impossible), which brings the Kingdom out of the eschat-
ological future and down from the heavenly heights to the earthly
present and to actual struggles of man, and which sees in
the concrete, given facts of external phenomena and inner feeling
the ' immediate guarantee of the Christian truths. Such a view, ex-
pressed in widely differing, often contradictory formulae is what
we should expect from a theological empiricist.
In a description of his method of work, he reveals the
illogical, intuitive type of mind which we may well call empirical.
In the preparation of lectures, he wrote to "^asemann in 1879, he
always felt uncertain; his intellectual confidence came only with
tlie actual delivery (Leben, II 262).
In a sense, Pitschl's empiricism was ims strength and his
glory. It gave him a certain freedom of motion; a disregard for
the hair-splitting of formal logic; a freshness and reality (of
conception; unfortunately not of expression) in the handling of
theological problems in their relations to the actual life of the
Cnristian Community. It permitted him to be what he became; the
teaclier of a generation, vhio inspired thousands, and compelled all
to reconsider fundamentals, and yet a teaclier who had not one
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Rut, precisely tiiC ernp i ri c i sru thst wus his Ftrer.fjth ;vas also
jiis -.veakness. First of a]], it tjrevented him from understanding
tlie only phii losopher s to whom he was willing to lend a hearing -
Kant and Lotze; surely - the x^roof of tnis assertion lies outside
the aim of the present treatise - neither of these great thinkers
would stand sponsor for the curious positivism of T. 1'.
Secondly, it closed liis eyes to the essential fact of the
unity of self-consciousness and of truth as an exrjression of the
attitude of a total personal life over against tne ’.Yorld. The
Kantian teacning of tiie activity of the self he accepted; hut the
unity of tne knowing subject ne did not grasp. "he three criteria,
as we ’nave discovered them, are an illustration of this fact. We
know tjie faith of the Coiomunity, we v/ill the Kingdom of God, we
feel 'the presence of given phenomena and emotions. But these three
facts stand separate, almost unrelated; as could not he the case if
hit sc hi iiad felt strongly the unity of the thinking, willing and
feeling subject. For this same reason, Ritschl could tolerate a
double truth - theoretical and religious - and (in liis later
writings) di s t inc ti vely repudiate any need for relation between the
two
.
Thirdly, the empiricism which hindered him from recognizing
the unity of the self permitted him to commit the fallacy of seeing
a unity "'here no ontological unity exists: namely, in the social
group of the Christian Coimnunity. Overlooking the fact that the
only real entities in that Comnunity and its history were the in-
dividuals, lie was led, by his “ni stori cal empiricism" to attribute
an importance to the idea of the Community tiiat quite seriously
hampers the et.aical individualism of Christianity. All that the
individual receives from God (according to 1) he has through the
£
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tiie mecilu.'!! of tiie Coniiuani t/. His just if ication and atoneuient
^neon si aply that ^le is a ineraher of tne Corrrnunity - of that real-
istic unity 'v'iiich exists "without reference to the counting of its
fflembers". He cannot he said to he really a believer in Christ un-
less he is identified with the Church, the worshiping Cormnunity.
V/i tin all due regard for tlie significance of tne social aspect of
Christianity which Ritschl rightly brought to the attention of the
Christian V/orld, we have no doubt that his opponents, who charged
iiim v/i th approaciiing the Cathol.ic conception of the Church as the
institution through which alone salvation is mediated, were moved
by a sound instinct.
Fourthly, as we have shown, Ritschl's eraxairic i s.m led iiiin to
a doctrine of the transcendence of God, whereas his Christian train
ing led Inim to a doctrine of immanence. On the whole, the former
conception dominated his thought. Once in the history and only
once has the transcendent God come into toucli with man: namely in
Christ. The development of the Christian Coimauni ty and the realiza
tion of the Kingdom must be thought, it is true, as caused by God;
but the only actual point of contact between God and the history
is in the Christ; all else is effect of this cause, inference from
tiiis premise. There is very little roomi for Ritschl to see Crod in
the C. ?., according to iiis principles; and he flatly refuses to
think about the fate of the nations that do not come under the
influence of the historical Community. Revelation is, then, a fact
of the past, a matter of tradition and nothing else; although we
gladly call attention to the fact that his empiricism also led him
to recognize ( inconsi stent ly ) tjie "personal sanctuary/". In general
however, God's presence in the World and in experience is the
exception and not the rule; God's existence can be known only by
fai
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di aregn rdiMfj- and overcoiaing the '.'oriel, wiiile one -’ccepte tne faith
of the CoriLTiuni ty . his erapiricism, tiien, was a grave limitation of
jiis ability to recognize divine truth in the actual experience of
life.
Finally, P.itschl's empiricism led him to another serious
limitation; namely, a decided retrenchment of the missionary and
evangelistic cnaracter of Christianity. He conceivea his task as
limited to the bounds of the Community; the Christian estimate of
other religions as purely a matter of mutual under standing among
Christians, and shall not be thought of as having validity for
others. Once in the Co/amunity, the Ritsciilian theology may liave
a message for us; but if we stand outside, what then? Ritschl
proposes to describe the religious environment in which he finds
himself; but his empiricism does not have the vision to see tliose
who do not yet stand wi tnin the gates. P.itsciil found it difficult
to forgive Luther for adaijting nis theology to the needs of "the
comr'!on, ordinary man" who does not go to Church; and he entertained
no hope of being able to bring the Buddhist and the llohamraedan to
an understanding, much less to an acceptance, of the Cnristian
view-point. Tne nations outside tiie raovement of occidental aistory
in which Christianity has, up to the present, chiefly flourished,
fare ill in P.itschl's hands. His ernpiricisia could not, or at least
did not, rise to tne universal point of view.
If we correct Ritschl ’ s empiricism by a personalism (of
professor Bowne’s type), that recognizes tlie unity of the subject,
and looks on the harmonious, consistent realization of the total
personal life as the ultir.ate criterion of truth, then we shall be
enabled to revise the three Ilitschlian criteria, recognizing the
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retain the emphasis on revelation, history ana Conii'uuni ty
;
we s’nall,
however, he led to interpret them not as the only knowledge of God
in a World where God is not, but as, on the whole, the clearest
signs of the nearne»ss of God in a World that is really full of
Him, when rightly tiiougiit. I'e shall conceive the human reason not
merely as a formal tool for arranging the materials of tneology,
nopelessly divided in itself between theoretical and religious
interests; but as an essential element in the one harmonious
personal life,- something that really helps us on our way to divine
truth. In 2
,
we can retain the inspiring faitn in the Kingdom and
t'iie goodness of God; but we shall not fall into the error of making
t/ie absolute contrast between wnat ought to "be and wnat is; our
personalistic criterion will insist on seeing the tokens of the
eternal i!:t}iQ3 of things precisely in the Kosmos as we experience it.
And in 3, we can recognize the worth of the emphasis on the given
in experience, and on feeling as one expression of the personal
life; and yet insist that the need of iiarmonizing the elements of
that life forbids us to take either the given phenomena or the
experienced feelings as a final criterion of the truth. V/e believe
that tiie way that we here indicate is the key to a sound estimate
of Ritschl* s work
.
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C Examination of German Criticisms
of Kitsch] in their Relation io the present r.esults.
As we approion tne task of examining the more important
German literature in regara to Ritschl, and of evaluating it in its
relation to our present results, we seem to be entering a recolrn of
almost hopeless confusion. The literature published during Ritschl’s
lifetime we shall in general leave untouched (as stateo above)
because it is too epnemeral and too partisan to be of present vnlue*
The bi bl i ograpiiy for this period is given in t’. T\’ippold’s otherwise
practically wortnless volume, "Die theologi sche Einzelschule im
Verhaltniss zur evangeli schen Kirche" (1893). A briefer bibli-
ography will also be found in L. Haug’ s "Darsteliung und Beurteilung
der Theologie Ritschls" (Stuttgart, lA.
,
188G
; 3A. , 189b), a book-
let which seems to have met tne needs of Lutheran pastors who de-
sired an acquain Lronce witn tne v/orks of Ritschl, without recourse
to the sources, but which does not display any marked degree of
critical acumen.
Ritschl's death, Karcii 20, 1889 did not put an end to ephemeral
and partisan writing about his theology; but from that time on the
criticisms become gradually more objective and serious. It is our
present aim to describe and evaluate the features of significance
that tnese criticisms contain for our problem. Our task is com-
plicated by the fact that no treatiaent which we have found approaches
Ritscnl from the point of view of the attempt to ascertain his
criterion of truth. The material does not lend itself to any
natural classification fron this standpoint. "e choose, therefore,
the chronological method as one which has the advantage of follow-











** V ”/ ^







i.5» #*!>: •'* ^ i.tif *.»y Vv ino(;^l4;i * ncr<<^0Xlia-
-
n f n-r' ' «*elnniw. jaoi’ji*
{sTu^iSc
•*^1 * V-r.wiiiW |rv^ r i I «” 9n»*^ tfX I C«il»*"iili -»*t»4 J
••*: i f
.
-•/ Jii.*>.%l(* ^0 : "» Co: PI i.
^Wl#4(iO «‘l‘lCJfCit -.. ttfrl-lppiSI 't*'^ V^K^nT-'.C'* ItXWf C'i'"
• is^iS iyin\ A . i .\. p ;ia:ip» ri^ti i*ja mm I'ttj [itn%9*i
I Jtf i»/lt'
* t. ^J,UiJ|: »,i, I •« C' 1 o»I» rxiw
*'
- vCHj .• ,tUCT £ ..>'f . -aXrtOA.tifi rijnol-otttn 'ttifr
-^6 i»i‘^ fc.Tplfrii ><i *ev4» »i .' *‘h " aX m '^a
»-i-,aooa7 iAfv’/lJl** - ' lo aBlIir ‘ >• r ?o.;. • alvoa .i oafia;
To • ' •vr.r.i4f:. jl|» eaoa rwXr/w .T.«r
tl«a&A*40 U* iftg0 y^p.: ^ ifimaH ,fUi»o eTIilpaii:H
*
(!u 9cnir f«iU -t'T'i *o«i ;\t^x 'Sv-jf n Kfo^A iwalifTM £>£H>
J
. i a
nuv •! :: .^v >*t^* .fTj ’
i;pil>lc .-; -i '
-•
tw** a<lxi tnXB yt-i
S3I
-woo «| il«»J 'UitV^ in- ?* 1 aai«l .^^na oao/JJ »mM




















By of introduction to the material, we oirect attention
to the fact that there is relatively little unani'^iity among
vriters on Ritschl, wlietner friendly or hostile to him. ’-^ov/ever,
in three points, which are a worthful orientation, we find agree-
ment. Firstly, all justly condemn Ritschl’s German style as ex-
traordinarily difficult, heavy and obscure; a fact which, in part,
accounts for the many mi sinterpre tations of ;.is ideas. Secondly,
all recognize the bitter and almost coarse ;;hnracter of the polemic
on botji sides of the controversy. The majority, even of Ritschl *3
friends, admit that ne was, in large measure, to blame for this
condition, chiefly through his pampnlet T. K. He called himself a
controversialist in theology (Leben, II 270). This fact adds to
the difficulty of a correct evaluation of essentials. Thirdly, all
concede that Ritsc/il had no disciple; that he did not found a
school, in the sense that Arrainius or Calvin founded a school.
Kone of the "Ri tschlians** is a mere follower of Ritschl’s; all are
independent thinkers, who depart, more or less, from Ritschl’s
fundamental principles.
The first criticism of our theologian to apr^ear after his
death was written by 0. Pfleiderer, and appeared in the *' Jahrbuciier
fur protestan ti sche Theologie" in April and December 1889 and in
June 1391; published in one volume "Die ritschl’ sche Theologie
kritisch beleuchtet" (Braunschweig, 1891). The first two essays were
written before Ritschl’s death; but Pfleiderer seemed almost to take
a certain pride in navirig them published in the follov/ing month never-
theless, in spite of their often discourteous tone. l^e points out,
correctly, the failure of Ritschl’s positivistic ontology; and
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(27) and atheist (7). Tixis inference is, doubtless, the logical
consequence of positivism; but Ritschl did not iLake it, and v/e
nave found that the faith of tne Community was far more fundamental
in lUtschl’s thinking than his positivism, which came late to
expression and is full of self-contradictions. Pfleiaerer fails
to note the connection between the emphasis on phenomena and on
feeling, as illustrations of the concept of the "given". In biis
judgment of the theory of values, ne sees only the subjective side,
and fails to note that Ritschl' s definition of the theory assumes
tiie revelation as given (19, 21f.). He calls attention to the
faultiness of Ritschl' s exegesis (3bff.). His fundamental criticism
is tne fact that religion and ethics have no essential connection
in Ritschl '
5
system (V, 79, 95); or in the terms of our results,
2 has no inner connection v;ith 1 and 3. Rut when he declares that
this antithesis, in the form of tne dualism of Kature and Spirit,
is the motive power of Ritschl' s thought - although neither a
Christian nor a religious idea - then we reply: not this distinction
but our criterion is the center of Ritschl' s thought; and further,
although this dualism was undoubtedly a grave flaw in Ritschl'
s
thinking, his interpretation of the mastery of the World (blessed-
ness or Christian Perfection) was a legitimate recognition of the
place of feeling in religion even if expressed in a tneoretical
form that must be rejected. And Ritschl' s failure to reconcile
ethics and religion was a theoretical failure; his religious faith
(1) reconciled them. Pfleiderer's criticism, although often led
by sound philosophical instincts over against Ritschlian empiricism,
does not betray an objective grasp of Ritsciil's thought nor the
ability to single out what, for Ritschl, were the essentials.
an ’ ' '






«• Do# ,.fi ^Ort a*C .w. - • - iSrOC lO »0(1^ U|;«S{ig9 *
'
I *itaaawt>ft«l T^'l %' '~~ -— ' ^ W>i ': - ’ 'cvl Uriaut
o^lat »ai<50 <iM '.' .a»y»xrii *ii' ii^i V?* 3«filo9J'ifi ni*
alifll loHOloXl'i ^^C-i Ji5>t ^'. O t'i bpa no
ao lino ra»f*o«ol *7 ;« f xa '•irMitii ni »nt <*ion oi
aifi III .•‘naviji** 4-«V' ^ «noi.tfri5Ajf {j iitM
.••lig^Urr ? ttOsrfJ <t»u 'o iassiabw(,
JMtyoo#) VTotit-T i .:'|f^.'«#*/&(t>#t|jf r«wt^ l^va. ot tl'is't bnii*’
•df ol Bi9Xffi^$im a c- ^ • r*1ld ^X i tft (KJWiilt«'9T * ti




. luo ^o ^ •*'
jfC •
Smii cairtXaTrh •in ooH '
lin« ?rtAl 3 ttj
9 ^il
;£k .V ,V}.««4«x* a‘Xrio»Jin ni
jdJlw fioiX o»rtnc*» tonnl on and 2
b io lu M- llidllf - Jf* f ini 9;ii ,«l«oaUXin^ siH?
® c i«nl|an rfi»*ioi ‘ = - to %owoq *»':^on al
t-
, 'V:' ‘ r
noriofiilolb stdJ fpn rx^-.'- if’f vifjMi • • *toix n^ilaiinD
.lOttljiA bn# ^ >iH a I floXiam^ 'tno
«*Xdo«lX!^ ai sail aou .^««f muliailti «IJ5 HgifodlXo
L
' V' »X'>i »;:inti4nxaX
*1:
*"
bIlo<f,«wtX lo v*: ’
.M* -'-ij
94iJ to npil tni|Qo#’i ^SfscL^i *j.£ jKxu \>:, : nalioiva) to 98*n
L9t)t4'yV»^(%J #,n£ ^ ffllir * ^ aonlq
• Mn-wtoit oj iM'ari I#*? tJ ’ - ^ei n St^iU mc»X ‘
Hi- a 4^ jpp noi;)tiii^ b*» «»jni# •
t # 1 e «i^'^ 0^: dl Xj* **: X 11 / i r ’• a * It r ib bf/Unooot [l)
I ;ur;tagi# iO»u .. ^ Xa>ii?iv# . ! brrUOo







"^uite from Pfleiderer’s point of view, and so not needing
furtiier nttention is LemiTie’s "Die Prinzipien der ri tschl ’ schen
Theologie" (1891).
At the beginning of the Winter Semester 1889, W. Herr.mann
of Marburg made his Rectorial address on the subject "Der
evangel! sclie Glaube und die Theologie Albrecht Ritschls" (Marburg,
lA.
,
1890, 2A., 1896), as close friend, personal and theological,
of the deceased master. Strongly subjective, ardently religious,
Herrmann is always .at his best in stating his own views; not in
criticising others. The present pamphlet contains, in reality,
but one thought of significance for us. Ritscjil’s idea of faith,
so Herrmann tells us, is of submission to the power of the reve-
lation of God (16). We have no doubt that Ri tschl would accept
this formulation; althougii he would explain it from the stand-
point of the Community and history, whereas Herrmann would give
more significance to the inner and immanent revelation in con-
science. Herrmann’s essay is a sympathetic and correct, but in-
complete depiction of one aspect of Ritschl’s view by a follower
whose own views had developed beyond his master's.
The conservative theology, especially in the persons of Frank
and Luthardt, had engaged in an active criticism of Ritschl during
his life time. In 1891, G. Schnedermann published his lecture on
"Frank and Ritschl" (Erlangen und Teipzig 1891), which he had
delivered Sept. 24, 1890 in Hohenstein - Ernstthal. Although
written from t}ie standpoint of Frank, the lecture is noteworthy
for its objectivity. It makes three points that we must note.
First, Schnedermann calls attention to Ritschl’s empirical theory
of knowledge, in accordance with our result. Second, he holds
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dogmatics. 'UVe iiave nere a systema ti 7a t i on of modern Christianity,
in so far as it is always learning and never arriving at a know-
ledge of the truth". He admits that, for Ritscnl, God is known only
out of His revelation, hut declares tnat Ritschl gives no answer
to tne question as to why Jesus Christ is revelation (17).
Schnedermann, like many others, overlooks the importance of tlie
Community - idea for Kitscnl; Christ is revelation, l^e would say,
because t'ne Community believes Him. This may not be for Frank or
Gchnedermann or for us the final word on the subject; but it was
for Ritschl the guiding principle and furnished him with what he
believed to be a perfect, complete and unsurpassable knowledge of
God as the firm foundation of his system. Schnederinann ’ s criticism
is, then, fundamentally unfair. And tliird, he repeats the charge
heard so often during Fiitschl’s lifetime, that he v/as a rational-
ist, his theology a "warming-over" of the principles of the
Enlightenment (23). To support tiiis, he asserts that Ritschl ’s
strength and significance lay in the reconstruction of theology
from the point of view of philosophical criticism. That Ritschl’
s
insistence on experience, his separation of Hature and Spirit and
nis demand for clear definition of theological terms show Kantian
influences, we freely admit. But a thinker whose chief polemic
was against Catholicism on the one hand and abstract and meta-
physical formulations on the otlier; wi:o found God in the history
and not in the reason, - cannot rightly- be described as being chief-
ly led by rationalistic motives. He did not attempt to deduce
theology from any rational principle. Nevertheless, Schnederma nn ’
s
criticismi is sounder and less bitter than Pf leiderer * s
.
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0. Ritscnl, the son oi our tnecloginn, ’’liber Werturteile"
(Freiburg und Leipzig, 189b ) . The essay is chiefly historical,
and represents, as might be expected, a close approximation to the
paternal view. He rightly identifies the value judgments with the
feeling of confidence in the '"hristian revelation (25); and holds
to tne exclusion of all theoretical knowledge, quite in his
father's spirit (24). nevertheless, we have to note two points
of difference from A. Ritschl's attitude. First: "From the very
first, all knowing is exclusively in the form of value- judging"
(34). But this is really a blow at the distinction between
tlieor e tical and religious knowledge, which 0. Ritschl meant to re-
tain. If all judgments are of one kind, namely value judgments,
where is the distinction? And second, 0. Ritschl views our value
judgments regarding Christianity as a confession of the fact that
tne strife among the religious and philosophical World view
is not settled, and as an anticipation, in hope, of the victory of
Christianity. He takes a position dictated by general rational
considerations, in contrast to his father's position wit’nin the
Community. we have already called attention to the fact that
0. Ritschl is wrong in asserting that A. Ritschl was influenced by
W. Herrmann in his tlieory of value-judging.
0. Fliigel, a representative of the Herbartian realistic met-
aphysics, published in lo95 the tiiird edition of his "A. Ritschis
piii 1 o sophi sc/ie und religious Ansiciiten"
,
a work which, in the first
edition, had been merely a criticism of Ritschl's philosophical
views, but which in the second and third editions was enlarged to
include the theological. Fliigel insists, as Pfleiderer and
v^ciinederrnann had done (we believe unjustly) in regarding Ritschl
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"jore from tiie philosophical than from tne theological point of
view (Preface to 3A. ) • From this standpoint, he accuses Ritschl
of materialism and pantheism, - that is, of the two World-views
wliicii he most decisively rejected. Flugel supports the former
charge by the assertion that it is tne principle of materialism
to recognize nothing but "the given”; and that Ritschl’ s positivism
(our 3 ) should logically draw the atheistic inferences of
materialism. 'Ve maintain, however, that Fliigel’s criticism is
one-sided; it is, indeed, sound, if "the given” in piienomena be
regarded as the only type of "given”. But our criterion 3 shows
that Ritschl viewed religious feeling and experience (Spirit)
as just as truly given and valid as piienomena (Nature). And, in
a wider sense, he viewed the whole content of criterion 1 as "given”
in the Community, and therefore true. Such a use of the concept
"given” is not justly described as materialism. Flugel also
charges Ritschl with pantheism. He attempts to prove this by
an identification of P.itsch]'s emphasis on the Spirit as over
against Nature, on self-activity and independence with Fichte’s
tneory of tiie ego and non-ego
;
and offers as principal evidence the
fact that Ritschl never mentions Fichte, although he refers to
Gchelling, Hegel and ''jchleiermacher . '"he argumen turn _e si lent i o
is always dangerous; especially so in this case, because the two
criteria with which Flugel reproaches Ritschl actually contradict
each other. On the one hand, he tells us, Ritschl says that only
the phenomena lly given is true; on the otner, that only what the
self has created is true. Flugel rias laid too great stress on
subordinate lines of thought. Finally, this critic fails to under-
stand Ritsctil’s theory of values. lie recognizes only that aspect
of the theory which teaches that Christianity satisfies the heart
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of mnn, and overlooks t'a- side of tne theory v/hich presupposes
the Christian revelation as given and true. Fliigel is v/rong rhen
he says (substantially as Gchnederma nn had done) that hitschi's
i^rounding of the authority of Jesus would take only tne Fichtean
form '*T)ie Gospel deserves to be true and so is true; dignity is
the ground of reality*' (60). hot such an argument leads Ritsc}il
to the recognition of Jesus; no, :^e finds Jesus in the Community
tradition and, therefore, (fundamentally) accepts Him. We are
unable to share the opinion of the "Theologi scher Jahresbericht *'
that Flugel is the most significant opponent of Ritschl.
In the year 1892, 0. Ritschl had published the first volume
of his "Albrecht Ritschls Leben" (Freiburg); in 1896 appeared the
second and more significant volume (Freiburg und Leipzig).
Conscientiously and carefully worked out in detail, with an abun-
dance of valuable material, this biography has many praiseworthy
features, not the least of which is the splendidly complete bibli-
ography of A. Ritschl' s writings at the close of each volume. The
many quotations from Ritschl' s letters are of the utmost signifi-
cance for an understanding of his intellectual development. It
is in such painstaking detail - work that this book excels. Prom
the stand-point of criticism, it accomplishes little. Ft regards
the development in 'itsclil’s thought as a steady improvement, "/ith
Wendland, we have to confess that we find no critical evaluation
of Ritschl' G thouglit in this book.
In R. Wegener’s "A. Ritsciils Idee des Reiches Gottes" (Leipzig,.
1897), we iiave a curiosity of criticism. Flugel’ s tracing of
Ritsclil's ideas to Fichte was a dangerous combination of the argu-
ments from silence and analogy: here we nave the hypothesis that
Ritschl' s idea of the Kingdom was aerived from the theologian
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Staudlin; is it not very rMjnpjciour. thnt ri tochl never mentions
this mon’s name? And does not Stand] in vie'v the ringdorn as "the
religious formula used 'by the speculative reason for the teleological
contemplation of the World and history" (38)? But there are two
fatal objections to tiiis interpretation. first, Ritschl's whole
life-work was a protest against the right of the speculative
reason in theology; and second, ills failure to unite the ethical
and the religious elements of ni s system forbids the opinion that
so rationally* unified a view as this lay at the basis of his
thought. Further, we may Judge of Wegener’s competency by such
utterances as these: "Ritschl r.oved exclusively in the realm of
dialectic imagination" (66); "Kant would never have risen from the
dead, if Schopenhauer had not resurrected aim" (97). The chief
merit of this book is that it calls attention, as pfleiderer had
already done, to the faulty exegesis on wliich Ritschl’s conception
of the Kingdom is based (74).
Tt would seem as if the criticism of Ritsclil had reached its
lowest ebb in this book. From this point on, the discussions
become perceptibly more objective and fairer. In 1897 appeared a
volume by 0. Ecke, "Die tlieologi sche Schule A. lUtschls und die
evangel ische Kirche der Gegenwart", At the time of its appearance,
so Kattenbusch says, the critics regarded it as 'oeing too late
for any further investigation of Ritschl’s tJiought. As a matter
of fact, the book was a token tiiat men were Just beginning to
understand Ritschl. The author, an orthodox Lutheran Biblicist,
was able, as no one before him had been, to appreciate the signifi-
cance of t/ie Ritschlian system as a ’wliole. Jie points out as
Ritschl's ost significant contribution "The energetic combination
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revelation in Cnrast, accompanied by a sharp refutation of all
unjustified claims of the theoretical reason". Ecke is the first
to see clearly that Ritschl is to be understood from the point of
view of the Christian revelation (our 1) and not from that of his
philosophical principles. In so far, our criterion 1 is a con-
firmation of Ecke’s result. 'That Ecke did not see was the signifi-
cance of the Christian CoirxTunity for the interpretation of what
the revelation meant.
A. Ilarnack' s review of Ecke's book (published in the "christliche
Veit" 1907, no. 37 and 38, republished in '^’arnack' s Aufsatze,
^d. II 347-3G8, Ciessen 1906) was, although brief, perhaps an even
more important contribution than Ecke's own. Harnack expresses
his substantial agreement with Ecke - excepting his orthodox
dogma of inspiration. he calls attention to the Ritschlian anti-
catholic polemic, particularly in G. P., - a work which most
discussions of P.itschl ignore; and emphasizes the Ritschlian de-
mand for a clear use of terms. Te have mentioned both of these
aspects frequently. There are, however, two points in which
Harnack comes to a conclusion out of narmony y?i th ours. First, he
insisted that Pitschl's goal was, empha tically
,
a unified s^'-stem
(352). It is, of course, true that he desired a theology free from
contradiction; but we contend that theological form was not his
goal; the given faith of the Community and the given data of phe-
nomena and feeling meant more to him than the demand for systematic
unity.
-.e was an empiricist in the fullest sense, not a rational-
ist. Harnack himself concedes, later on, that Ritschl did not
emphasize sufficiently the need of unity and consistency in the
tlieology won from tne Bible (357). Ritsclil wrote in a letter to
his son (May 5, 1888) that in the revision of R. V., he was abso-
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lutelv actcnisned at boi.ie of the triings he had written fifteen
years hefore; "so little is my meraory able to master all the de-
tails of the structure that I built then" (Leben, II 510). These
are not words of a man to whom system v’be everything. Harnack’s
second assertion seems to us even more misleading. he says that
Kitschl wanted to erect a universally valid system (558). But vie
hold that the traces of that desire in Ritschl, such as the use of
the idea of God for the scientific explanation of the V/orld, and
a rationalistic ethics (2) are precisely not characteristic. For
the defence of our x^osition, we have only, as above, to quote
harnack against Karnsek. He says that Ritschl’ s theology is con-
structed "from tVie standjjoint of the Community", and so simj^ly
sets aside niany important problems (361). Now, Ritschl' s Coimmuni-
ty - theology clearly disdains validity for Buddhists and ''^ohamined
ans. It is true that a theology which is to satisfy mankind must
strive for universal validity; but it is not true that Ritschl aim
ed at that goal.
J. Wendland's "Albrecht Ritschl und seine Gchuler" (Berlin,
1699) was the next significant treatment, from the point of view
of a somewhat rationalistic scnolar of Lipsius. It is valuable
for its bibliographies; for the breadth of vision which seeks to
relate Ritschl to the general culture and liistory of his times;
and for the combination of syrcpatny and critical insight in riis
attitude toward the details in Ritschl’ s system. Unfortunately,
he lacked the ability to pick out and empliasize the larger aspects
of Ritschl’ s thought; he is, however, right in pointing out (as
Pfleiderer and others had done) timt the ethical (our 2) and re-
ligious (1 and 3) elements are not reconciled by Ritsci.l (96);
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He does good service in calling attention to Pa^scni's indif-
ference to the concrete historical facts and historical investi-
gation of the life of Jesus (84-89); but, like other critics, fails
to recognize the central importance that the nistorical Community
assumed in Ritschl’s thought (traces in 78, 84).
One of Ritschl's former students, E. Vischer, published in
1900 a lecture on "Albrecht Ritschl's Ansciiauung von evangel! schem
Clauben and Leben" (Tubingen), a popular, almost eloquent, plea
for ills conception of Ritschl’s idea of faith. He believes that
Ritschl protested "against the opinion that views faith as trie
acceptance of a series of dogmas, the holding of certain historical
facts as true" (8); and that he insisted on the person of Christ
as the revelation of Cod. This is Herrmann’s interpretation, also.
Vischer recognizes that the Ritschlian antithesis to Pietism and
Catholicism is a fundamental element, and that it is an emphasis
on the Community and tiie history as opposed to the individual soul
(35). But because Vischer does not relate tlie protest against
viewing faith as mere acceptance of dogma (whicn we do not find
clearly expressed in Ritsclil) and the emphasis on the historical
Jesus to each other, his interpretation is, after all, not very
i llurainating.
^itschl’s friend, also a former student, D. Kattenbusch
published a lecture "Von Sc/ileiermacher zu Ritschl" (Giessen),
which reached its third edition in 1903. q* von Schultess in
Th, L. Z. 1893, Ho. 3, called Kattenbusch’ s point of view the
decisive one for the understanding of Ritschl. '"endland, on the
contrary, regards it as "completely wrong". The position is this:
Scheiennacher
,
and all theologians influenced by him (except
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ing point of tneology (14). Kitychl broke v'i th thin method, and
made ti.e gospels his starting point (55, 59). Tiiis result is a
partial stater/ient of our criterionl, and in full agreement v’ith
it. 'Vendland attacks it on the ground that value Judgments are
feelingsi, inner experiences; but reply, fundamentally the value
Judgments presuppose the Christian "orld-view, as the ethical pre-
supposes the dogmatic. Ka ttenbusch’ s critej-ion corresponds to the
more characteristic side of Ritschl’s theory.
'mong the writers interested in popularizing the results of
the hitschlian t'neology, Constantin von Kugelgen occupies a
significant place. A second edition "Grundriss der ri tschlschen
Logmatik” appeared in Leipzig in 1903. Althoug}i not intended to
be more than an exposition of the master’s system, it is noteworthy
in marking can advance in the ability objectively to understand
Litschl's tliought. Kugelgen sees, for instance, that the reve-
lation in Christ (137) and not Kantian rationalism (134) was the
basis of Litschlian dogmatics; and erripliasizes Ritschl's return to
t}ie classic origins of the Lutheran reformation. In other words,
Khgelgen lays practically exclusive stress or. our criterion 1; but
does not perceive the presence of 2 and 3.
,^^nold K'dster, the pastor of the Erldserk irche in Hamburg -
Borgfelde delivered a lecture in June, 1904 on the subject, ’’Worin
besteht die bleibende Pedeutung Ritschls fur die protestan ti sclie
Theologie?” and published it later in the same year. Roster’s
net result is as follows; the permanent significance of Ritschl
consists in his systematic theology which is founded on the "science
of the Reformation". Like Fligelgen and Ecke, Roster recognizes
our criterion 1 as the essential a^^pect of Ritschl’s thouglit.
Roster sees implied in this a protest r^gainst in tellec tua li sm.
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s t i c i sm and against all nierarchies; positively, he characterizes
P.itsc?il’s view as Confessionalsirn. It is true, he does not mean
this to oe an exhaustive account of the entire system, hut only
of the permanently significant elements in it. "^'oster attains to
-his result in the heat of a political campaign regarding the
status of the Confession in the schools. his neglect of our
crli,ej'ia £. and p ig.^ then, adequately explained.
The stream of litoiature on our theologicon continued at flood
vide. In 19C5, Prof. Herrmann, nitscjil's most brilliant inter-
preter, wrote an essay on "Protestant Dogmatics", w’nich appeared
^n the series "Die Kultur der Gegenwart, in the volume "Die
o]ij i st 1 i ciie Religion". Tliis essay contained important references
to our subject. It points out three ideas as fundamental in
P.itschl. Tile first is tiiat religion lives from history. This is
implicit in the reference to the Community in our first criterion,
ihe second is tiiat he did not feel the problem of the relation be-
tween criticism and
.historical faith. This we have called atten-
tion to in our exposition. The third is (as Kattenbusch had
previously taught) that revelation, the gospel, not the fact of
faith, is Ritschl’s ultimate. Py faitij, Herrmann means the over-
whelming confidence in God wrought by God Himself in a human soul.
Our analysis of the Community faith in Ritschl's system would lead
us to accept Herrmann's formula at this point. Put Herrmann, part-
ly on account of his own polemic against mysticism, did not proper-
l^r evaluate the elements, partly mystical and partly positivistic,
in which };itschl made "the given" his implicit criterion of truth.
Professor Carl Stange's book ’’Der dogmatisciie Rrtrag der
1 i tschlsc}ien I'heologie" ( Leipzig, 1 906 ) , is a ci-iticism of J. Kaftan
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rather than of Kitschl himc^elf. But the very self-assurance with
which Stange asserts that the Ritsclilian theology lias been laid
on the table, and his ironical apology for a new work on nitschl-
ianism as an anachronism, betray the fact that the subject v^as
still a living issue. But Stange misunderstands ^itschl; he commits
the fallacy, exploded by Biigelgen and others, of supposing that
r;i tschliatni sm is essentially rationalism; or at any rate consists
of an oscillation betv/een positive Christian and rationalistic
elements. We do not need to point out again the injustice of such
a conception (1). He is, however, right in pointing out tiie loose
relation between the two ports of theology - religious faith and
scientific form (4).
The most recent work, "Die Sntv-'icklung in 'Ibreclit Hitschls
Theologie von 1674 bis 1889" (Tubingen, by C. Fabric ius, 1909),
although devoted to one special problem, is perhaps the most
valuable and thorough work tViat we possess. Kis inductive method
and his mastery of the material are surpassed by no writers on
Kitschl. In his results, Fabricius agrees vrith 0. Ritsclil (Leben)
and with our conclusions in the fact that, vhiile botii ethics and
revelation v?ere in R. V., lA. norrmative, in P. V., 2, 3A. the
emphasis was laid miore strongly on revelation. Fabricius, howevei,
sees in this a deterioration, while 0. P.itschl saw natural growth
and improvement. But froni tlie point of view of our criticism of
the Kitschlian empiricism, we are unable to see any fundamental
change in this shifting of emphasis. So long as Kitschl remained
an Empiricist, he was bound to fail in the attempt to attain a
satisfactory system. 'te call attention to the fact tliat both 0.
Ritschl and Fabricius fail to give tiie central j)]ace to the Com-
munity to which v;e were led by our investigations, and that neither
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1recognizes tiie concept of the “given" an we liave found it.
The two criticisjTS on 0. Patschl and pabricius are also true
of ti^e other critics whose writings we have discussed. Our con-
ception, then, supplements that of previous investigators, and on
t;ie otJ-ier liand, 'we have found no cause for altering any of our
conclusions. ur final verdict is, then, that Kitschl was an
ernpiriciat with three different criteria of truth, of which the
faith of the historical Communit^'^ in the revelation of God in
Cnrist was the most significant; ethics and tne concept of the
"given" being of minor importance.
Ritsciil attained no unity in ids thought. But his own words
regarding Schlei ermacher apply so fittingly to himself that we
close by quoting them;
"It is a frequent experier.ce that that fruitful idea that a
man discovers ventures forth only in abbreviated or half-concealed
form, like a bud which is not yet opened by the full liglit of
knov'ledge; or that some aspect of the idea that is being developed
is slighted, because there is in the mind of the thinker a vision
of the whole that is too mighty not to overshiadow, as it were, a
part of itself" (Schl.,11). V/ith lUtschl, it was the intellectual
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,
founded 1856.




"Theologische Li teraturzei tung"
,
founded 1876.





"Methodist Eeview", New York City.





founded 1876; A. Ritschl
was on the board of editors.
"Zeitschrift fur Li rchenrecht"
,
founded 1862.
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